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Abstract
We deﬁne reactive simulatability for general asynchronous systems. Roughly, simulatability means that a real system
implements an ideal system (speciﬁcation) in a way that preserves security in a general cryptographic sense. Reactive means
that the system can interact with its users multiple times, e.g., in many concurrent protocol runs or a multi-round game. In
terms of distributed systems, reactive simulatability is a type of reﬁnement that preserves particularly strong properties, in
particular conﬁdentiality. A core feature of reactive simulatability is composability, i.e., the real system can be plugged in
instead of the ideal system within arbitrary larger systems; this is shown in follow-up papers, and so is the preservation of
many classes of individual security properties from the ideal to the real systems.
A large part of this paper deﬁnes a suitable system model. It is based on probabilistic IO automata (PIOA) with two main
new features: One is generic distributed scheduling. Important special cases are realistic adversarial scheduling, procedure-
call-type scheduling among colocated system parts, and special schedulers such as for fairness, also in combinations. The
other is the deﬁnition of the reactive runtime via a realization by Turing machines such that notions like polynomial-time
are composable. The simple complexity of the transition functions of the automata is not composable.
As specializations of this model we deﬁne security-speciﬁc concepts, in particular a separation between honest users and
adversaries and several trust models.
The beneﬁt of IO automata as the main model, instead of only interactive Turing machines as usual in cryptographic
multi-party computation, is that many cryptographic systems can be speciﬁed with an ideal system consisting of only one
simple, deterministic IO automaton without any cryptographic objects, as many follow-up papers show. This enables the
use of classic formal methods and automatic proof tools for proving larger distributed protocols and systems that use these
cryptographic systems.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we present the reactive simulatability (RSIM) framework for general asynchronous systems.
More precisely, we present the deﬁnition of reactive simulatability and a general reactive asynchronous system
model as a basis for this deﬁnition and many other general security deﬁnitions and theorems.
1.1. The idea of reactive simulatability
The basic idea of reactive simulatability, sometimes abbreviated as RSIM, is to deﬁne under what conditions
one system, typically a real cryptographic system, securely implements another system, typically a much simpler
speciﬁcation called ideal system. Roughly, we deﬁne that this is true if everything that can happen to the honest
users of the real system, with strong real adversaries, can also happen to the same honest users if they use the
ideal system, where adversaries do not occur or at least have far less power. What happens to the users includes
the aspect of the adversary’s knowledge about the users’ behavior and secrets.
Deﬁnitions of a real system implementing a speciﬁcation are well-known in the ﬁeld of distributed systems
and often called reﬁnement; however, normal reﬁnement does not retain conﬁdentiality properties and is there-
fore not suitable for most security systems, in particular for most cryptographic systems and protocols. For
instance, if one deﬁnes an ideal secure channel essentially as a black box where messages are put in on one side
and come out on the other side, normal notions of correct implementation by a distributed system allow that
intermediate parties learn the messages. For security and cryptography, however, this should not happen if the
ideal secure channel gives no information to such parties.
In cryptography, a suitable notion of secure implementation, typically called simulatability, was already
deﬁned for ideal systems (speciﬁcations) that are just functions: each party makes one input at the begin-
ning and obtains one output at the end. Essentially, we extend this notion to reactive systems, i.e., systems
where parties may make inputs and obtain outputs at many different times. Examples of reactive cryptographic
systems are multi-round auctions, protocols with many concurrent sessions, and untraceable electronic cash
systems because whether a payment succeeds depends on prior cash withdrawal actions. For all these systems
one requires conﬁdentiality properties, so that the relation between a real system and a speciﬁcation cannot
only be the classical reﬁnement of distributed systems. Reactive simulatability makes the real-and-ideal system
speciﬁcation technique available for such types of systems.
An important property of reactive simulatability is composability. Roughly this means that a larger system
can be deﬁned based on the speciﬁcation of a subsystem, in other words with an ideal subsystem, and then
the real subsystem can be plugged in instead without causing any signiﬁcant difference. The notion of “no sig-
niﬁcant difference” is again reactive simulatability. Composability is generally required of reﬁnement relations
in distributed systems. The idea of reactive simulatability has also become known as universal composability
(UC) for such properties. (We describe the history of these terms and theorems in Section 1.7.) Reactive sim-
ulatability also offers property preservation, i.e., if one proves certain important properties of an ideal system,
then they also hold for the real system. An example of such a property is that the participants in a payment
system cannot spend more money than they put in initially or received. Such properties are not always trivial
to show for an ideal system, but usually very much easier than if one had to do it directly for the real system.
However, for length reasons of this ﬁrst journal version with detailed deﬁnitions, we do not prove any compo-
sition and property preservation theorems here although the ﬁrst ones were in the corresponding conference
publication.
1.2. Link to formal methods and tool-supported proofs
As just explained, reactive simulatabilitywith its notion of ideal systems is an important newway of specifying
reactive cryptographic systems and protocols, besides the classical way of deﬁning many individual properties,
where each property immediately contains details about adversaries, polynomial-time considerations, and error
probabilities.
Besides this general motivation, a speciﬁc motivation for deﬁning reactive simulatability was that it offers an
important link between cryptography and formal methods, in particular automated proof tools such as model
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checkers and theorem provers. Interest in such a link can be justiﬁed from both prior cryptographic protocol
proofs and from prior tool-supported proofs of security protocols: The cryptographic motivation is essentially
the limit of human stamina when dealing with themany different sequences of actions occurring in executions of
even relatively small protocols. The tool-supported proofmotivation is the prior lack of demonstrated soundness
with respect to real cryptography. We now discuss this in more detail.
Typical cryptographic proofs are reductions between the security of an overall system under consideration
and the security of the cryptographic primitives used: One shows that if one could break the overall system, one
could also break one of the primitives with respect to its cryptographic deﬁnition, e.g., adaptive chosen-message
security for signature schemes. In principle, these proofs are as rigorous as typical proofs in mathematics. In
practice, however, human beings are extremely fallible with such proofs when protocols are concerned. This is
mainly due to the distributed-systems aspects of the protocols. It is well-known from non-cryptographic dis-
tributed systems that many wrong protocols have been published even for very small problems. Hand-made
proofs are highly error-prone because following all the different orders of interleaving of the actions of different
participants is extremely tedious. Humans tend to take wrong shortcuts and do not want to proof-read such
details in proofs by others. If the protocol contains cryptography, the situation is even worse: Already a rigorous
deﬁnition of the goals and of the protocol itself gets more complicated, and there was previously no general
framework for this. Compared with protocol proofs outside security, which are mostly for trace properties,
i.e., properties of individual runs, conﬁdentiality properties are more complex because they are properties of
entire probability spaces of runs. Moreover, in principle the complexity-theoretic reduction has to be carried
out across all the different interleavings, and it is not at all trivial to do this rigorously. In consequence, there are
very few real cryptographic proofs of larger protocols, and several times supposedly proven, relatively small sys-
tems were later broken. Hence, tool support should be very welcome, at least for the tedious distributed-system
aspects.
In fact, work on tool-supported proofs of cryptographic protocols started as early as work on computational
cryptographic deﬁnitions and proofs. Tools mean model checkers and automatic theorem provers; initially
mostly special-purpose for security protocols, nowadays mostly specializations of more general tools. However,
for a very long time all these proofs were based on idealized abstractions of cryptographic primitives, almost
always by representing cryptographic operations as operators of a term algebra with cancellation rules, so-called
Dolev-Yao models. For instance, public-key encryption is represented by operators E for encryption and D for
decryption with one cancellation rule, D(E(m)) = m for all m. Encrypting a message m twice in a Dolev-Yao
model does not yield another message from the basic message space but the term E(E(m)). The models assume
that two terms whose equality cannot be derived with the cancellation rules are not equal, and every term that
cannot be derived is completely secret. This simpliﬁes proofs of larger protocols considerably. However, origi-
nally there was no foundation at all for such idealizations of cryptographic primitives, and thus no guarantee
that protocols proved with these tools are secure when implemented with real cryptography. Although no previ-
ously proved protocol has been broken when implemented with standard provably secure cryptosystems (if one
excludes proofs in formal models that have more semantic problems than the cryptographic ones, in particular
those based on logics of belief because of the typically unjustiﬁed monotonicity of belief, and only regards the
properties that were proved), this was clearly an unsatisfactory situation, and artiﬁcial counterexamples can be
constructed.
Themain use of reactive simulatability in the context of linking cryptography and formal methods in a sound
way is that it can be the gauge for decidingwhether an idealization is securely realized by a speciﬁc cryptographic
implementation, or even realizable by any such implementation. One speciﬁc goal, achieved later, was to apply
this gauge to Dolev-Yao models. However, the approach is not at all limited to Dolev-Yao models—many
possible ideal systems used as speciﬁcations for cryptographic systems are quite simple and can thus be encoded
into existing proof tools, so that those proof tools can be used when larger systems are proved that use these
cryptographic systems.
1.3. Requirements on the system model
The ﬁrst obstacle to deﬁning reactive simulatability was that there was no system model, i.e., a model of
protocol participants and how they interact, that combined all the features we desire:
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Fig. 1. Overview of our layers of deﬁnitions.
• Allowing reactive systems.
• Enabling systemdeﬁnitions that are not encumbered byTuringmachine details, in particular for ideal systems
and with the aim of encodings into some current proof tools.
• Allowing run-time considerations, because most cryptographic systems are only secure against computa-
tionally bounded adversaries. We also desire composability of runtimes; in particular the combination of
polynomial-time entities should be polynomial again. This is particularly important in compositions, where
the protocol machines of higher layers become the users of the lower-layer systems. Users also have to be
polynomially bounded so that an adversary cannot ofﬂoad computations to them in active attacks.
• Asynchronous systems with a sufﬁciently ﬂexible scheduling model that all typical cases can be represented.
A scheduling model deﬁnes how it is determined in which order different actions, in particular of different
distributed entities, occur. In particular, we want to allow:
− scheduling by the adversary with realistic information;
− procedure-call-style scheduling for colocated components; this occurs in particular in compositions,
when a higher-layer entity uses a lower-layer entity in the same location; and
− restricted scheduling, e.g., fair schedulers for liveness-style considerations (i.e., requirements that some-
thing should happen, possibly within restricted time), or for encoding synchronous systems.
• Independence of trust models. This means that the core system model should not ﬁx issues like what com-
putational power an adversary has, how it can corrupt participants, and how it can manipulate messages on
channels. There are many variants of this, and we want to be able to express them all.
We address the last requirement by ﬁrst deﬁning a core systemmodel without any security considerations, i.e.,
an extension of existing distributed-system models by more generic scheduling and by runtime considerations.
Then we specialize this with a small number of general security concepts such as the notion of an adversary and
an honest user. Finally, we deﬁne some speciﬁc examples of trust models, mainly for real systems, in particular
for static and dynamic adversaries and for channels with different types of security. These layers and the main
deﬁnitions we make on each layer are surveyed in Fig. 1. The ﬁrst four requirement above all refer to the lowest
layer. Some details of these requirements may become clearer when we explain how we address them.
1.4. Asynchronous system model with general distributed scheduling and runtimes
We use an IO automata model as our core model, in other words state-transitions systems that specify the
next output and state for every given input and state. Given the importance of probabilism in cryptography
we need probabilistic IO automata (PIOAs). We did not choose interactive Turing machines as the core model,
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although this was normal at that time in cryptography, because of our requirement that ideal systems, if they are
simple in principle, should be easy to encode into existing proof tools from our concrete speciﬁcation. IO auto-
mata are the typical basis for encoding distributed systems into the speciﬁcation languages of standard theorem
provers. Furthermore, most formal languages (i.e., with fully ﬁxed syntax) for distributed systems have some
state-transition system as their semantics. Informally also cryptography has often used IO automata, because
nobody actually speciﬁes cryptographic protocols as Turing machines; the speciﬁcations in articles are much
closer to IO automata as soon as they go beyond simple arrow pictures.
One novelty is that we allow essentially arbitrary scheduling schemes. The basis of scheduling is message
delivery: In an asynchronous system, a message does not arrive immediately at its recipient, but may be held up
in the network. In our generic distributed scheduling, one can designate for each connection which party decides
about the arrival of the messages on this connection; we call this party the scheduler of this connection. Thus,
in particular we can model the special cases required above:
• We can let the adversary schedule everything by making it the scheduler of all connections.
• For procedure-call style interactions between a colocated caller and a service, we let the caller schedule the
connection to the service, and let the service schedule the reverse connection. Each of them immediately
schedules each of its messages on these connections.
• Or a separate scheduler can schedule everything, or only certain connections (e.g., secure ones) while the
adversary schedules others.
While the generic distributed scheduling allows many more variants, these three (in particular combinations
of the ﬁrst and the second) are mostly used in subsequent work.
For computational complexity, the easiest option would be to consider the complexity of the state-transition
function of the IO automata. The complexity of functions is well-deﬁned and we would never need to mention
the underlying bit-level model like Turing machines, in particular if we concentrate on notions like polynomial-
time that are robust against small model variations. However, polynomial-time transitions do not even lead to
overall polynomial runtime when such a machine runs essentially alone: For instance, such a machine might
double the size of its current state in each transition; thus it can use time exponential in its initial state size
after a linear number of transitions with one-bit inputs. In a medium notion, which we call weakly polynomial-
time, the runtime of the machine is polynomial in the overall length of its inputs and its initial state. A weakly
polynomial-time machine is a permissible adversary when interacting with a cryptographic system which is in
itself polynomially bounded; i.e., this seems to be the weakest useful deﬁnition. However, this notion does not
compose: Several weakly polynomial-time machines together can become too powerful. E.g., each new output
may be twice as long as the inputs so far. Then with a linear number of interactions, these machines can use time
exponential in the size of their initial states.
Hence, we deﬁne polynomial-time machines as those that only need time polynomial in their initial state size,
independent of all inputs. This notion is composable.
We nevertheless use weakly polynomial-timemachines sometimes, becausemany functionalities are naturally
weakly polynomial-time and not naturally polynomial-time.
We made one further addition to individual machines compared with other I/O automata models, in order
to enable machines to have polynomial runtime independent of their environment without being automatically
vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks by long messages: We allow state-dependent length bounds on the inputs
that a machine will read from each channel.
1.5. Security-related system model
Reactive simulatability is about systems, users, and adversaries: If the same honest users use either the real
or the ideal system, they should not notice a difference, even though the real system typically gives an adversary
much more power than the ideal system. Hence, we have to deﬁne users and adversaries. The general system
model sketched in Section 1.4 simply allows “open” systems that can interact with some environment. The
user-adversary distinction is essential but quite simple: We split the interaction opportunities (later called ports;
also think of them as unattached connections) into some for the honest users and others for the adversary. We
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Fig. 2. Overview of reactive simulatability.
call the former service ports. We call such an open system with a split into service ports and others a structure,
and if we augment it by an honest user and an adversary in the designated way, we call it a conﬁguration.
We also deﬁne systems as sets of structures; this is the general provision for trust models which allow that
instead of one structure intended by a designer (e.g., with n machines for n users, connected by point-to-point
channels), one of many different semi-corrupted structures is actually present (e.g., with fewer machines because
some were taken over by the adversary, and with wiretaps on the channels).
1.6. Reactive simulatability variants
We have already introduced reactive simulatability, the main goal of our deﬁnitions, in Section 1.1. Fig. 2
illustrates it, including typical identiﬁers that we use for various parts. The left half illustrates a real system. Here
it consists of a structure with only two machines (PIOAs) M1 and M2. An entirety of honest users H uses it via
the service ports, and an adversary A interacts both with the two “normal” machines and the honest users. This
is compared with the ideal system on the right side. In this example, the structure in the ideal system consists of
just one machine, which we often call TH for “trusted host” (corresponding to the intuition that a trusted host
would simply do for the participants what in reality they have to do via a complex cryptographic protocol).
Formally there is no difference between ideal and real systems in our model; this is useful in compositions and
other multi-part security proofs. The same honest users use the ideal structure via the same service ports, and
there may again be an adversary A′.
We deﬁne reactive simulatability in several variants: In one dimension, we vary the order of quantiﬁers in the
statement that for all honest users H and all adversaries A on the real system, there should be an adversary A′ on
the ideal system that achieves the same effects. What we just wrote is general reactive simulatability (GRSIM). If
the ideal adversary does not depend on the honest users (only on the real adversary and of course the system),
we speak of universal reactive simulatability (URSIM), i.e., then the quantiﬁer order is ∀A∃A′∀H. If the ideal
adversary consists of a ﬁxed part that uses the real adversary as a blackbox, we speak of blackbox reactive
simulatability (BRSIM) and call the ﬁxed part simulator. In another dimension, we have a perfect, a statistical,
and a computational variant, depending on computational restrictions and the degree of similarity we require
between the real and the ideal system.
1.7. Prior work
Simulatability, i.e., the notion of using a simple ideal system as a speciﬁcation for a cryptographic system, was
ﬁrst sketched for secure multi-party function evaluation, i.e., for the computation of one output tuple from one
tuple of secret inputs from each participant, in [99]. It was deﬁned (with different degrees of generality and rigo-
rosity) in [58,30,81,38]. Among these, [30] and an unpublished longer version of [81] contain the earliest detailed
execution models for cryptographic systems that we are aware of. Both are synchronous models. Problems such
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as the separation of users and adversaries, or deﬁning runtime restrictions in the face of continuous external
inputs, do not occur in the function-evaluation case, since function evaluation is non-reactive. A composition
theorem for non-reactive simulatability was proven in [38].
The idea of simulatability was subsequently also used for speciﬁc reactive problems, e.g., [55,32,44],
without a detailed or general deﬁnition. In a similar way it was used for the construction of generic solu-
tions for large classes of reactive problems [57,56,61] (usually yielding inefﬁcient solutions and assuming
that all parties take part in all subprotocols). A reactive simulatability deﬁnition was ﬁrst proposed (after
some earlier sketches, in particular in [57,90,38]) in [61]. It is synchronous, covers a restricted class of pro-
tocols (straightline programs with restricted operators, in view of the constructive result of this paper), and
for the information-theoretic case only, where quantiﬁcation over input sequences can be used instead of
active honest users.
We ﬁrst presented a synchronous version of a general reactive system model and reactive simulatability in
[91]. The report version also contains further variants of the reactive simulatability deﬁnitions with proofs of
equivalence or non-equivalence that are likely to carry over to the asynchronous case.
After that, and later but independently to the conference version [92] of the current paper, an asynchronous
version of a general reactive model and reactive simulatability was also given in [39]. The model parts that
were relatively well-deﬁned seem to us a strict subset of our model: The system correspond to our “crypto-
graphic systems with adaptive adversaries” in Section 6.3, always with polynomial-time users and adversaries.
The entities are deﬁned as Turing machines only, i.e., there is no explicit abstraction layer like our IO automata.
The simulatability deﬁnition corresponds to the universal case of ours. Besides the model, the paper contains
a composition theorem which was more general than ours at that time, while we had a property preservation
theorem. Here the term UC (universal composability) was coined which is nowadays also widely used for the
general idea of reactive simulatability or the deﬁnitions. (The paper also contains some sketches, while we had
decided to only publish parts that we had actually deﬁned and proved.)
The ﬁrst rigorousmodel for reactive systems that covers cryptography, i.e., probabilistic and polynomial-time
aspects, was presented in [73,74]. It is based on -calculus and uses formal language characterizations of polyno-
mial time. The notion of security is observational equivalence. This is even stronger than reactive simulatability
because the entire environment (corresponding to our users and adversary together) must not be able to distin-
guish the implementation and the speciﬁcation. However, this excludes many abstractions, e.g., because a typical
abstract speciﬁcation is one machine and the real system is distributed with channel manipulation possibilities
for the adversary, so that an adversary can already distinguish them by their structure. Correspondingly, the
concrete speciﬁcations used essentially comprise the actual protocols including all cryptographic details. There
was no tool support for the proofs at that time, as even the concrete speciﬁcations involved ad-hoc notations,
e.g., for generating random primes.
Reductions as cryptographic proofs were introduced for cryptographic primitives in [35,59,100]. The best-
known application to protocols is the handling of authentication protocols originating in [33]. Examples of later
breaks of supposedly proven cryptographic systems are given in [89,52,63].
The Dolev-Yao models underlying most proof tools for cryptographic protocols were introduced in [53].
Some important examples of their ﬁrst use in different types of proof tools are [83,80,69,77,88,97,1]. Soundness
of these models with respect to real cryptography was ﬁrst considered in [2], but only under passive attacks. This
corresponds well to the fact that there was not even a deﬁnition for such a comparison under active attacks,
and only reactive simulatability provided this later. Logics of belief for cryptographic protocol proofs were
introduced in [36]. A semantics for such a model (in the sense of an execution semantics, still relying on a Do-
lev-Yao model for the cryptography) was ﬁrst given in [3]. Careful study of this semantics shows that one needs
hand-proofs of strong protocol properties before the logic applies; this is never done in practice. This is why we
did not count breaks of protocols proven in such logics as counter-arguments against the Dolev-Yao models or
proof tools relying on normal distributed-systems semantics.
IO automata were already used for security in [79]. There however, cryptographic systems are restricted to
the usual equational speciﬁcations following a Dolev-Yao model [53], and the semantics is not probabilistic.
Only passive adversaries are considered and only one class of users, called environment. The author actually
remarks that the model of what the adversary learns from the environment is not yet general, and that general
theorems for the abstraction from probabilism would be useful. Our model solves these problems.
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So far we looked at prior security deﬁnitions. We now consider literature on system models as such. Our
IO automata are based on normal ﬁnite-state machines; deterministic and non-deterministic versions, also with
inﬁnite state, have been used widely throughout the distributed protocol literature. Probabilistic IO-automata
and execution models for them are deﬁned in [94,78,98]. There the order of events is chosen by a probabilistic
scheduler that has full information about the system. However, this can give the scheduler too much power in a
cryptographic scenario. In cryptology, the typical understanding of asynchronous systems, closest to a rigorous
deﬁnition in [37], is that the adversary schedules everything, but only with realistic information, in terms of both
observations and computational capabilities. Recall that this is still an important special case in our model. We
are sometimes asked why we do not just elaborate this case. However, there are situations where one deﬁnitely
needs more benign scheduling or even some synchrony, as in our third special case (e.g., one may want to show
liveness properties, but can only do so if one can model that messages are eventually delivered). As to local
scheduling among system parts modeled as different automata but considered co-located, adversarial sched-
uling may often do no harm. However, having to prove it when one actually is considering a local situation,
only deﬁned as a composition, would just introduce unnecessary complications into the proof. Modeling only
adversarial scheduling would remove the need to represent who schedules what, while the underlying model of
asynchronous connections would remain the same. Problems with purely adversarial scheduling were already
noted in [74]; hence they schedule secure channels with uniform probability before adversary-chosen events.
However, that introduces a certain amount of global synchrony. Furthermore, we do not require speciﬁc sched-
uling for all secure channels; they may be blindly scheduled by the adversary (i.e., without even seeing whether
there are messages on the channel). For instance, this models the case where the adversary has a global inﬂuence
on the relative network speed.
There are also probabilistic versions of other detailed distributed-systems frameworks than IO automata,
but apart from [73,74] we are not aware of a prior one with polynomial-time considerations or any speciﬁc
scheduling considerations for security.
We are also not aware of any prior model with a representation of both honest users and adversaries.
1.8. Subsequent work
As mentioned before, it has been shown that reactive simulatability has at least the properties expected of a
reﬁnement notion in distributed systems: First, it is indeed transitive [92]. Secondly, it has a composition theorem
that states that substituting a reﬁned system (an implementation) for the original system (a speciﬁcation) within
a larger system is permitted [92]; compositionality of reactive simulatability in different settings has been inves-
tigated in [39,75,24,65,51,67,70]. Thirdly, one can deﬁne computational versions of various security property
classes and prove preservation theorems for them under reactive simulatability, in particular for integrity [91,11],
key and message secrecy [19], transitive and non-transitive non-interference [16,15], i.e., absence of information
ﬂow, and classes of liveness properties [22,10].
Various concrete cryptographic systems have been proven secure in the sense of reactive simulatability with
respect to ideal speciﬁcations that are not encumberedwith cryptographic details. This comprises securemessage
transmission [92,46], key exchange [46], and group key agreement [96]. Under additional assumptions such as the
existence of a common random reference string, this was extended to commitment schemes [43], oblivious trans-
fer [48,54], zero-knowledge proofs [43], and, more generally, any multi-party function evaluation [48]. Reactive
simulatability also proved useful for lower-layer proofs, e.g., of reactive encryption and signature security from
traditional (non-reactive) encryption and signature security within [92,40] and [41,25,26], respectively, and of
reactive Difﬁe-Hellman security within [96].
A particularly important ideal speciﬁcation that has been proven to have a cryptographic realiza-
tion secure in the sense of reactive simulatability is a speciﬁc Dolev-Yao model [23,27,17,21], now-
adays referred to as the BPW model. The BPW model offers a comprehensive set of Dolev-Yao-
style operations for modeling and analyzing security protocols: both symmetric and asymmetric encryp-
tion, digital signatures, message authentication codes, as well as nonces, payload data and a list (pair-
ing) operation. Proofs of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol [14], the Otway-Rees protocol [5], the
Yahalom protocol [20], an electronic payment protocol [7], and parts of public-key Kerberos [6] us-
ing the BPW model show that one can rigorously prove protocols based on this model in much the
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same way as with more traditional Dolev-Yao models. Weaker soundness notions for Dolev-Yao mod-
els such as integrity only or ofﬂine mappings between runs of the two systems, and/or allowing less
general protocol classes, e.g., only a speciﬁc class of key exchange protocols, have been established
in [82,72,45]. For these cases, simpler Dolev-Yao models and/or realizations can be used compared
to [23].
Establishing reactive simulatability for concrete systems has proven an error-prone task if approached
rather informally, as it requires to carefully compare various behaviors of an ideal speciﬁcation with
corresponding behaviors of the concrete system. We emphasize that it is quite easy to guess almost
correct ideal speciﬁcations of cryptography systems; the major part of the work lies in getting the
details right and making a rigorous proof. Several abstractions presented with less detailed proofs
have been broken [63,9] (where the ﬁrst paper attributes another such attack to Damgård). In or-
der to establish reactive simulatability in a rigorous manner, the notion of a cryptographic bisimula-
tion has been introduced in [23] and further extended in a sightly different framework in [42]. Cryp-
tographic bisimulations are based on the notion of probabilistic bisimulations [71], which capture that
two systems that are in related states and receive the same input will yield identically distributed
states and outputs after they performed their next transition. Cryptographic bisimulations extend this
notion with imperfections and, in the case of the BPW model, an embedded static information-ﬂow
analysis.
As far as automation of security proofs in the context of reactive simulatability is concerned, it was ﬁrst
shown that automated proof tools can handle small examples of reactive simulatability proofs, based on the
ideal speciﬁcation of secure message transmission [12,11]. Later it was shown that the BPW model is accessible
to theorem proving techniques using the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL [95]. This constitutes the ﬁrst tool-sup-
ported framework for symbolically verifying security protocols that enjoys the strong cryptographic soundness
guarantees provided by reactive simulatability. Fully automated techniques for proving secrecy properties of
security protocols based on the BPW model have been invented in [13] using mechanized ﬂow analysis. In the
wider ﬁeld of linking formal methods and cryptography, there is also work on formulating syntactic calculi for
dealing with probabilism and polynomial-time considerations directly, in particular [84,85,68,50,34]. This is
orthogonal to the work of justifying Dolev-Yao models: In situations where Dolev-Yao models are applicable
and sound, they are likely to remain important because of the strong simpliﬁcation they offer to the tools,
which enables the tools to treat larger overall systems automatically than with the more detailed models of
cryptography.
Finally, the expressiveness of reactive simulatability, i.e., the question which cryptographic tasks can be
assigned a suitable ideal functionality under which assumptions, has been investigated in a series of papers. It
has been shown that several cryptographic tasks cannot be proven secure in the sense of reactive simulatability
unless onemakes additional set-up assumptions, e.g., by postulating the existence of a common random reference
string. Among these tasks are bit commitment, zero-knowledge proofs, oblivious transfer [43], (authenticated)
Byzantine agreement [76], classes of securemulti-party computation protocols [47], classes of functionalities that
fulﬁll certain game-based deﬁnitions [49], and Dolev-Yao style abstractions of XOR and hash functions [18,28].
Other set-up assumptions to circumvent such impossibility results are to augment real and ideal adversaries
with oracles that selectively solve certain classes of hard problems [93], to free the ideal adversary from some
of its computational restrictions [29], or to impose constraints on the permitted honest users [8]. The price is
either a narrower model tailored to a speciﬁc problem, sacriﬁcing the transitivity of reactive simulatability and
hence signiﬁcantly complicating the modular construction of larger protocols, or providing only a limited form
of compositionality.
1.9. Overview of this paper
Section 2 introduces notation. Section 3 deﬁnes the general system model, i.e., machines, both their abstract
version and their computational realization, and executions of collections of machines. Section 4 deﬁnes the
security-speciﬁc system model, i.e., systems with users and adversaries. Section 5 deﬁnes reactive simulatability,
i.e., our notion of secure reﬁnement. Section 6 shows how to represent typical trust models, i.e., assumptions
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about the adversary, such as static threshold models and adaptive adversaries, with secure, authenticated and
insecure channels. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Notation
Let Bool:= {true, false}, and let  be the set of natural numbers and 0 :=  ∪ {0}. For an arbitrary set A,
let P(A) denote its powerset. Furthermore, let An denote the set of sequences over Awith index set I = {1, . . . , n}
for n ∈ 0, A∗ :=⋃n∈0 An, and A∞ the set of sequences over A with index set I = . We write a sequence over
A with index set I as S = (Si)i∈I , where ∀i ∈ I: Si ∈ A. Let ◦ denote sequence concatenation, and ( ) the empty
sequence. Let {( )} denote the empty Cartesian product. For a sequence S ∈ A∗ ∪ A∞ we deﬁne the following
notation:
• For a function f :A → A′, let f(S) apply f to each element of S , retaining the order.
• Let size(S) denote the length of S , i.e., size(S) := |I| if I is ﬁnite, and size(S) := ∞ otherwise.
• For l ∈ 0, let Sl (read “S restricted to l elements”) denote the l-element preﬁx of S , and S[l] the l-th element
of S with the convention that S[l] =  if size(S) < l (for a ﬁxed symbol ). We sometimes write Sl instead of
S[l] to increase readability.
• For a predicate pred:A → Bool , let (S[i] ∈ S|pred(S[i])) denote the subsequence of S containing those ele-
ments S[i] of S with pred(S[i]) = true, retaining the order.
We lift the restriction notation to ﬁnite sequences of sequences: For T = (T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ (A∗ ∪ A∞)∗ and L =
(L1, . . . ,Ln) ∈ ∗0 with the same n ∈ 0, let T L:= (T1L1 , . . . , TnLn).
In the following, we assume that a ﬁnite alphabet  ⊇ {0, 1, c, l, k} is given, where ∼, !, ?,↔ , ∈ . Then ∗
denotes the strings over. Let  be the empty string and+ := ∗ \ {}. All notation for sequences can be used
for strings, such as ◦ for string concatenation, but ◦ is often omitted.
For representing natural numbers and sequences of strings as strings, we assume a surjective function
nat:∗ →  with the convention nat(1) = 1, and a bijective function : (∗)∗ → ∗. We assume that stan-
dard operations are efﬁciently (polynomial-time) computable in these encodings; concretely we need this for
inverting the function , for appending an element to a sequence of strings, and for retrieving and removing the
nat(u)-th element from a sequence of strings.
For an arbitrary set A let Prob(A) denote the set of all ﬁnite probability distributions over A, i.e., those prob-
ability distributions D that are actually deﬁned on a ﬁnite subset A′ of A, augmented by D(A \ A′) = 0. For a
probability distribution D over A, the probability of a predicate pred:A → Bool is written PrD(pred). If x is a
random variable over A with distribution D, we also write PrD(pred(x)). In both cases we omit D if it is clear
from the context.
We write := for deterministic and ← for probabilistic assignment. The latter means that for a function
f :X → Prob(Y), we write y ← f(x) to denote that y is chosen according to the distribution f(x). For such a
function f we write y := f(x) if there exists y ′ ∈ Y with Prf(x)(y ′) = 1. If the function f is clear from the context,
we also write x →p y for Prf(x)(y) = p , and → for →1. Furthermore, we sometimes treat f(x) as a random
variable instead of a distribution, e.g., by writing Pr(f(x) = y) for Prf(x)(y).
3. Asynchronous reactive systems
In this section, we deﬁne our model of interacting probabilistic machines with distributed scheduling and
with computational realizations.
3.1. Ports
Machines can exchange messages with each other via ports. Intuitively, a port is a possible attachment point
for a channel when a machine is considered in isolation. As in many other models, channels in collections of
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Fig. 3. Ports and buffers.
machines are speciﬁed implicitly by naming conventions on the ports; hence we deﬁne port names carefully.
Fig. 3 gives an overview of the naming scheme.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Ports). Let P := +× {, ↔, } × {!, ?}. Then p ∈ P is called a port. For p = (n, l, d) ∈ P , we call
name(p) := n its name, label(p) := l its label, and dir(p) := d its direction.
In the following we usually write (n, l, d) as nld , i.e., as string concatenation. This is possible without ambigu-
ity, since themapping ϕ:P → +◦ {, ↔, } ◦ {!, ?}with ϕ((n, l, d)) := nld is bijective because of the precondition
!, ?,↔ , ∈ .
The name of a port serves as an identiﬁer and will later be used to deﬁne which ports are connected to each
other. The direction of a port determines whether it is a port where inputs occur or where outputs are made.
Inspired by the CSP [62] notation, this is represented by the symbols ? and !, respectively. The label becomes
clear in Deﬁnition 3.3.
Deﬁnition 3.2 (In-Ports, Out-Ports). A port (n, l, d) is called an in–port or out–port iff d = ? or d = !, respectively.
For a set P of ports let out(P) := {p ∈ P|dir(p) = !} and in(P) := {p ∈ P|dir(p) = ?}. For a sequence P of ports
let out(P) := (p ∈ P|dir(p) = !) and in(P) := (p ∈ P|dir(p) = ?).
The label of a port determines the port’s role in the upcoming scheduling model. Roughly, ports p with
label(p) ∈ {↔, } are used for scheduling whereas ports p with label(p) =  are used for “usual” message trans-
mission.
Deﬁnition 3.3. A port p = (n, l, d) is called a simple port, buffer port or clock port iff l = , ↔, or , respectively.
After introducing ports on their own, we now deﬁne the low-level complement of a port. Later each port and
its low-level complement will be regarded as directly connected. Two connected ports have identical names and
different directions. The relationship of their labels l and l′ is visible in Fig. 3, i.e., l = l′ =  or {l, l′} = {,↔ }.
The remaining notation of Fig. 3 is explained below. In particular, “Buffer n˜” represents the network between
the two simple ports n! and n?. If we are not interested in the network details then we regard the ports n! and n?
as connected; thus we call them high-level complements of each other.
Deﬁnition 3.4 (Complement operators). Let p = (n, l, d) be a port.
(a) The low-level complement pc of p is deﬁned as pc := (n, l′, d ′) such that {d , d ′} = {!, ?}, and l = l′ =  or
{l, l′} = {,↔ }.
(b) If p is simple, the high-level complement pC of p is deﬁned as pC := (n, l, d ′) with {d , d ′} = {!, ?}.
3.2. Machines
After introducing ports, we now deﬁne machines. Our primary machine model is probabilistic state-transi-
tion machines, similar to probabilistic I/O automata as in [94,78]. A machine has a sequence of ports, containing
both in-ports and out-ports, and a set of states, comprising sets of initial and ﬁnal states. When a machine is
switched, it receives an input tuple at its input ports and performs its transition function yielding a new state and
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an output tuple in the deterministic case, or a ﬁnite distribution over the set of states and possible outputs in the
probabilistic case. Furthermore, each machine has state-dependent bounds on the length of the inputs accepted
at each port to enable ﬂexible enforcement of runtime bounds, as motivated in Section 1. The part of each input
that is beyond the corresponding length bound is ignored. The value ∞ denotes that arbitrarily long inputs are
accepted.
Deﬁnition 3.5 (Machines). A machine is a tuple
M = (name ,Ports ,States, , l, Ini,Fin )
where
• name ∈ + ◦ {∼, } is called the name of M,
• Ports is a ﬁnite sequence of ports with pairwise distinct elements,
• States ⊆ ∗ is called a set of states,
• Ini,Fin ⊆ States are called the sets of initial and ﬁnal states.
• l: States → (0 ∪ {∞})|in(Ports)| is called a length function; we require l(s) = (0, . . . , 0) for all s ∈ Fin ,
•  is called a probabilistic state-transition function and deﬁned as follows:
Let I := (∗)|in(Ports)| and O := (∗)|out(Ports)| denote the input set and output set of M, respectively.
Then :States× I → Prob(States× O) with the following restrictions:
− If I = (, . . . , ), then (s, I) := (s, (, . . . , )) deterministically.
− (s, I) = (s, Il(s)) for all I ∈ I . (The parts of each input beyond the length bound is ignored.)
In the following, we write nameM for the name of machine M, PortsM for its sequence of ports, StatesM, IniM,
FinM for its respective sets of states, IM, OM for its input and output set, lM for its length function and M for its
transition function.
The chosen representation makes the transition function  independent of the port names; this enables port
renaming in our proofs. The requirement for -inputs, i.e., the ﬁrst restriction on , means that it does not matter
if we switch a machine without inputs or not, i.e., there are no spontaneous transitions. The second restriction
means that the part of each input beyond the current length bound for its port is ignored. In particular one can
mask an input by a length bound 0 for a port. The restriction on l means that a machine ignores all inputs if it
is in a ﬁnal state, and hence it no longer switches.
We will often need the port set of a machine instead of its port sequence as well as the port set of an entire
set of machines.
Deﬁnition 3.6 (Port set). The port set ports(M) of a machine M is the set of ports in the sequence PortsM. For a
set Mˆ of machines, let ports(Mˆ ) :=⋃M∈Mˆ ports(M).
In the following, we deﬁne three disjoint types (subsets) of machines. Whether a machine is of one of these types
depends only on its name and ports. All machines that occur in the following will belong to one of these types.
Simple machines only have simple ports and clock out-ports, and their names are contained in +. We do
not make any restrictions on their internal behavior.
Deﬁnition 3.7 (Simple machines). A machine M is simple iff nameM ∈ + and for all p = (n, l, d) ∈ ports(M) we
have l =  or (l, d) = (, !).
Similar to simple machines, default schedulers only have simple ports and clock out-ports, except that they
have one special clock in-port clk?, called the default-clock in-port. For reasons of compatibility with existing
papers based on the RSIM framework, we also introduce the terminology master scheduler and master-clock
in-port to denote the default scheduler and the default-clock in-port, respectively.Whenwe deﬁne the interaction
of several machines, the default-clock in-port will be used to resolve situations where the interaction cannot
proceed otherwise. A default scheduler makes no outputs (i.e., formally only empty outputs) in a transition that
enters a ﬁnal state. This will simplify the later deﬁnition that the entire interaction between machines stops if a
default scheduler enters a ﬁnal state.
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Deﬁnition 3.8 (Default schedulers). A machine M is a default scheduler iff
• nameM ∈ +,• clk? ∈ ports(M),
• for all p = (n, l, d) ∈ ports(M) \ {clk?}, we have l =  or (l, d) = (, !), and
• if Pr(M(s, I) = (s′,O)) > 0 with s′ ∈ FinM and arbitrary s ∈ StatesM and I ∈ IM, then O = (, . . . , ).
If a simple machine or a default scheduler M has an out-port n! or an in-port n? we say that M is the sending
machine or receiving machine for n, as shown in Fig. 3.
As the third machine set, we deﬁne buffers. All buffers have the same predeﬁned transition function. They
model the asynchronous channels between other machines, and will later be inserted between two ports n! and
n? as shown in Fig. 3. More precisely, for each port name n, we deﬁne a buffer denoted as n˜ with three ports
n?,n↔?, and n↔!. When a value is input at n↔?, the transition function of the buffer appends this value to
an internal queue over ∗. An input u /=  at n? is interpreted as a natural number, captured by the function
nat, and the nat(u)-th element of the internal queue is removed and output at n↔!. If there are less than nat(u)
elements, the output is . As the two inputs never occur together in the upcoming run algorithm, we deﬁne that
the buffer only evaluates its ﬁrst non-empty input. Since the states have to be a subset of ∗ by Deﬁnition 3.5,
we embed the queue into ∗ using the embedding function  for sequences (see Section 2).
Deﬁnition 3.9 (Buffers). For every n ∈ + we deﬁne a machine n˜ called a buffer:
n˜ := (n∼, (n?,n↔?,n↔!),States˜n, ˜n, l˜n, Ini˜n,∅)
with
• States˜n:= {(P)|P ∈ (∗)∗},
• Ini˜n := {( ( ) )},
• l˜n((P)) := (∞,∞) for all (P) ∈ States n˜, and
• ˜n((P), (u, v)) := ((P ′), (o)) deterministically as follows:
if u /=  then
if nat(u)  size(P) then
P ′ := (P [i] ∈ P |i /= nat(u))
o := P [nat(u)]
else
P ′ := P and o := 
end if
else if v /=  then
P ′ := P ◦ (v) and o := 
else
P ′ := P and o := 
end if
In the following, a machine with a tilde such as n˜ always means the unique buffer for n ∈ + according to
Deﬁnition 3.9.
3.3. Computational realization
For computational aspects, amachine M is regarded as implemented by a probabilistic interactive Turingma-
chine as introduced in [60]. We need some extensions of this model of probabilistic interactive Turing machines.
The main feature of interactive Turing machines is that they have communication tapes where one machine
can write and one other machine can read. Thus, we will use one communication tape to model each low-level
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connection. Probabilism is modeled by giving each Turing machine a read-only random tape containing an
inﬁnite sequence of independent, uniformly random bits. To make each Turing conﬁguration ﬁnite, we can
instead newly choose such a bit whenever a cell of the random tape is ﬁrst accessed. Each Turing machine has
one distinguished work tape; it may or may not have further local tapes, which are initially empty.
Our ﬁrst extension concerns how the heads move on communication tapes; our choice guarantees that a
machine can ignore the ends of long messages as deﬁned by the length functions in our I/O machine model, and
nevertheless read the following message. This helps machines to guarantee certain runtimes without becoming
vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks by an adversary sending a message longer than this runtime. This enables
liveness properties, although those are not considered in this paper. The second extension concerns restarts of
machines in a multi-machine scenario. We guarantee that a switching step with only empty inputs is equivalent
to no step at all, as in the I/O machine model.
By a Turing machine whose heads recognize partner heads we mean a Turing machine whose transition
function has the following inputs: of course the ﬁnite state of the machine, and for each head of the machine,
the content of the cell under this head and a bit denoting whether another head is on the same cell.
Deﬁnition 3.10 (Computational realization of machines). A probabilistic interactive Turing machine T is a proba-
bilistic multi-tape Turing machine whose heads recognize partner heads. Tapes have a left boundary, and heads
start on the left-most cell. T implements a machine M as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 3.5 if the following holds. Let
iM := |in(PortsM)|. We write “ﬁnite state” for a state of the ﬁnite control of T and “M-state” for an element of
StatesM.
(a) T has a read-only tape for each in-port of M. Here the head never moves left, nor to the right of the other
head on that tape. For each out-port of M, T has a write-only tape where the head never moves left of the
other head on that tape.
(b) T has special ﬁnite states restartint (where “int” is similar to an interrupt vector) with int ∈ P{1, . . . , iM} for
waking up asynchronously with inputs at a certain set of ports, sleep denoting the end of an M-transition,
and end for termination. Here restart∅ = sleep, i.e., T needs no time for “empty” transitions.
(c) T realizes M(s, I) as follows for all s ∈ StatesM and I ∈ IM: Let T start in ﬁnite state restartint where
int := {i|I [i]lM(s)[i] /= } /= ∅, with worktape content s, and with Ii on the i-th input tape from (including)
T ’s head to (excluding) the other head on this tape for all i. Let s′ be the worktape content in the next
ﬁnite state sleep or end, and O[i] the content of the i-th output tape from (including) the other head to
(excluding) T ’s head in that state. Then the pairs (s′,O) are distributed according to M(s, I), and the ﬁnite
state is end iff s′ ∈ FinM.
The main reason to introduce a Turing-machine realization of the machine model is to deﬁne complexity
notions. The interesting question is how we handle the inputs on communication tapes in the complexity deﬁni-
tion, in particular for the notion of polynomial time, which is the maximum complexity allowed to adversaries
against typical cryptographic systems.
One can imagine three degrees of an interactive machine being polynomial-time. The weakest would be that
each M-transition only needs time polynomial in the current inputs and the current state, i.e., the current content
of the local tapes. However, such a machine might double the size of its current state in each M-transition; then
it would be allowed time exponential in an initial security parameter after a linear number of M-transitions.
Hence, we do not use this notion.
In the medium notion, which we call weakly polynomial-time, the runtime of the machine is polynomial in the
overall length of its inputs, including the initial worktape content. Equivalently, the runtime for each M-tran-
sition is polynomial in the overall length of the inputs received so far. This makes the machine a permissible
adversary when interacting with a cryptographic system which is in itself polynomially bounded. However, sev-
eral weakly polynomial-time machines together (or even one with a self-connection) can become too powerful.
For example each new output may be twice as long as the inputs so far. Then after a linear number of M-tran-
sitions, these weakly polynomial-time machines are allowed time exponential in an initial security parameter.
We nevertheless use weakly polynomial-time machines sometimes, because many functionalities are naturally
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weakly polynomial-time and not naturally polynomial-time in the following strong sense. However, one always
has to keep in mind that this notion does not compose as we just saw.
Finally, polynomial-timemachines are those who only need time polynomial in their initial worktape content,
independent of all inputs on communication tapes.
A run of a probabilistic, interactive Turing machine is a valid sequence of conﬁgurations of T (deﬁned as
for other Turing machines), where the ﬁnite state end can only occur in the last conﬁguration of the run.
Deﬁnition 3.11 (Complexity of machines).
(a) A probabilistic interactive Turing machine T is polynomial-time iff there exists a polynomial P such that
all possible runs of T are of length at most P(k), i.e, take at most P(k) Turing steps, where k is the length
of the initial worktape content.
(b) T is called weakly polynomial-time iff there exists a polynomial P such that for every ﬁxed initial worktape
content and ﬁxed contents of all input tapes with overall length k ′, all possible runs of T are of length at
most P(k ′).
(c) A machine M according to Deﬁnition 3.5 is (weakly) polynomial-time iff there exists a (weakly) polyno-
mial-time probabilistic interactive Turing machine that implements M according to Deﬁnition 3.10.
More generally, if we say without further qualiﬁcation that T fulﬁlls some complexity measure, we mean that
all possible runs of the machine fulﬁll this measure as a function of the length k of the initial worktape content.
Besides the deterministic runtime bounds that we have deﬁned and that we will use in the following, one could
deﬁne bounds for the expected runtime. Alternative deﬁnitions of polynomial-time speciﬁcally for reactive sys-
tems have recently been proposed [64,70], see [70] for a comparison. These deﬁnitions can be easily incorporated
in the Reactive Simulatability framework.
3.4. Collections of machines
After introducing individual machines, we now focus on collections of ﬁnitely many machines, with the intu-
ition that these machines interact. Each machine in a collection must be uniquely determined by its name, and
their port sets must be pairwise disjoint so that the naming conventions for low- and high-level complements
will lead to well-deﬁned one-to-one connections.
Deﬁnition 3.12 (Collections).
(a) A collection Cˆ is a ﬁnite set of machines with pairwise different machine names, pairwise disjoint port sets,
and where each machine is a simple machine, a default scheduler, or a buffer.
(b) A collection is called (weakly) polynomial-time iff all its non-buffer machines are (weakly) polynomial-
time.
(c) If n˜,M ∈ Cˆ and n! ∈ ports(M) then we call M the scheduler for buffer n˜ in Cˆ , and we omit “in Cˆ ” if it is
clear from the context.
If a port and its low-level complement are both contained in the port set of the collection, they form a low-
level connection; recall Deﬁnition 3.4. High-level connections for simple ports are deﬁned similarly. If a port p is
contained in the port set of the collection but its low-level complement is not, p is called free. Free ports will
later be used to connect external machines to the collection. For instance, a collection may consist of machines
that execute a cryptographic protocol, and their free ports can be connected to users and an adversary.
Deﬁnition 3.13 (Connections). Let Cˆ be a collection.
(a) If p , pc ∈ ports(Cˆ ) then {p , pc} is called a low-level connection. The set gr(Cˆ ) := {{p , pc}|p , pc ∈ ports(Cˆ )}
is called the low-level connection graph of Cˆ .
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Fig. 4. Phases of the run algorithm.
(b) By free(Cˆ ) := ports(Cˆ ) \ ports(Cˆ )c we denote the free ports in Cˆ .
(c) If p , pC ∈ ports(Cˆ ) then {p , pC} is called a high-level connection. The set Gr(Cˆ ) := {{p , pC}|p , pC ∈
ports(Cˆ )} is called the high-level connection graph of Cˆ .
Given a collection of (usually simple)machines, wewant to add buffers for all high-level connections tomodel
asynchronous timing. This is modeled by the completion of a collection Cˆ . The completion is the union of Cˆ
and buffers for all existing ports except the default-clock in-port. Note that completion leaves already existing
buffers in Cˆ unchanged. A collection is called closed if the only free port of its completion is the default-clock
in-port clk?. This implies that a closed collection has precisely one default scheduler, identiﬁed by having the
unique default-clock in-port.
Deﬁnition 3.14 (Closed collection, completion). Let Cˆ be a collection.
(a) The completion [Cˆ ] of Cˆ is deﬁned as
[Cˆ ] := Cˆ ∪ {˜n|∃l, d : (n, l, d) ∈ ports(Cˆ )\{clk?}}.
(b) Cˆ is closed iff free([Cˆ ]) = {clk?}, and Cˆ is complete iff [Cˆ ] = Cˆ .
3.5. Runs and their probability spaces
For a closed collection, we now deﬁne runs (in other terminologies executions or traces).
3.5.1. Informal description
We start with an informal description. Machines switch sequentially, i.e., we have exactly one active machine
M at any time. If this machine has clock out-ports, then besides its “normal” outputs, it can select the next
message to be delivered by scheduling a buffer via one of these clock out-ports. If the selected message (i.e., a
message at the selected position) exists in the buffer’s internal queue, it is delivered by the buffer and the unique
receiving machine becomes the next active machine. If M tries to schedule multiple messages, only one is taken,
and if it schedules none or the message does not exist, the default scheduler X (which exists since we consider a
closed collection) becomes active.
Next we give a more precise, but still only semi-formal deﬁnition of runs. Runs and their probability spaces
are deﬁned inductively by the following algorithm for each tuple ini of initial states of the machines of a closed
collection Cˆ . The algorithm maintains variables for the states of all machines of the collection and treats each
port as a variable over ∗, initialized with  except for clk? := 1. The algorithm further maintains a variable
MCS (“current scheduler”) over machine names, initialized with MCS := X, for the name of the currently active
simple machine or default scheduler, and a variable r for the resulting run, an initially empty list. The algorithm
operates in ﬁve phases, which are illustrated in Fig. 4. Probabilistic choices only occur in Phase 1.
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1. Switch current scheduler: Switch the current machine MCS, i.e., set (s′,O) ← MCS(s, I) for its current state
s and in-port values I . Then assign  to all in-ports of MCS.
2. Termination: If X is in a ﬁnal state, the run stops. (As X made no outputs in this case, this only prevents
repeated inputs at the default-clock in-port.)
3. Store outputs: For each simple out-port o! of MCS with o! /= , in their given order, switch buffer o˜ with
input o↔? := o!. Then assign  to all these ports o! and o↔?.
4. Clean up scheduling: If at least one clock out-port of MCS has a value /= , let n! denote the ﬁrst such port
according to their given order and assign  to the others. Otherwise let clk? := 1 and MCS := X and go to
Phase 1.
5. Deliver scheduled message: Switch n˜ with input n? := n!, set n? := n↔! and then assign  to all ports of
n˜ and to n!. If n? =  let clk? := 1 and MCS := X. Else let MCS := M′ for the unique machine M′ with
n? ∈ ports(M′). Go to Phase 1.
Whenever a machine (this may be a buffer) with name nameM is switched from (s, I) to (s
′,O), we add a
step (nameM, s, I , s
′,O) to the run r with the following two restrictions. First, we cut each input according to
the respective length function, i.e., we replace I by I ′ := IlM(s). Secondly, we do not add the step to the run if
I ′ = (, . . . , ), i.e., if nothing happens in reality. This gives a family of probability distributions (run
Cˆ ,ini
), one
for each tuple ini of initial states of the machines of the collection. Moreover, for a set Mˆ of machines, we deﬁne
the restriction of runs to those steps where a machine of Mˆ switches. This is called the view of Mˆ . Similar to
runs, this gives a family of probability distributions
(
view
Cˆ ,ini
(Mˆ )
)
, one for each tuple ini of initial states.
3.5.2. Rigorous deﬁnitions
Wenowdeﬁne theprobability spaceof runs rigorously. Since the semi-formaldescription is sufﬁcient tounder-
stand our subsequent results and the rigorous deﬁnitions are quite technical, this subsection can be skipped at
ﬁrst reading.
We ﬁrst deﬁne a global state space and a global transition function on these states. The global state space
has ﬁve parts: the states of all machines of the collection, the current scheduler (currently active machine), a
function assigning strings—the current values—to the ports of the collection, the current phase, and a subset of
the out-port sequence of one machine for modeling the “for”-loop in the third phase of the informal algorithm.
Additionally, the global state space contains a distinguished global ﬁnal state sﬁn .
Deﬁnition 3.15 (Global states of a collection). Let Cˆ be a complete, closed collection with default scheduler X.
Let P
Cˆ
:= {P |∃M ∈ Cˆ : P ⊆ out(Ports M)} where ⊆ denotes the subsequence relation.
• The set of global states of Cˆ is deﬁned as
States
Cˆ
:= ×M∈Cˆ StatesM × Cˆ × (
∗)ports(Cˆ ) × {1, . . . , 5} × P
Cˆ
∪ {sﬁn}.
• The set of initial global states of Cˆ is deﬁned as
Ini
Cˆ
:= ×M∈Cˆ IniM × {X} × {f } × {1} × {( )}
with f(clk?) := 1 and f(p) :=  for p ∈ ports(Cˆ ) \ {clk?}.
On these global states, we deﬁne a global transition function. It reﬂects the informal run algorithm.
Deﬁnition 3.16 (Global transition function). Let Cˆ be a complete, closed collection with default scheduler X. We
deﬁne the global transition function

Cˆ
:States
Cˆ
→ Prob(States
Cˆ
)
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by 
Cˆ
(sﬁn) := sﬁn and otherwise by the following rules:
Phase 1 (Switch current scheduler).
(
(sM)M∈Cˆ ,MCS, f , 1, P
)
→p
(
(s′M)M∈Cˆ ,MCS, f
′, 2, ( )
)
(1)
where, with I := f(in(Ports MCS)) and O := f ′(out(Ports MCS)),
• p = Pr
(
MCS(sMCS , I) = (s′MCS ,O)
)
,
• sM = s′M for all M ∈ Cˆ \ {MCS}, and
• f ′ (in(Ports MCS)
) = ()|in(PortsMCS )| and f ≡ f ′ on ports(Cˆ ) \ ports(MCS).
Phase 2 (Termination).
(
(sM)M∈Cˆ ,MCS, f , 2, P
)
→ sﬁn if sX ∈ FinX; (2)
(
(sM)M∈Cˆ ,MCS, f , 2, P
)
→
(
(sM)M∈Cˆ ,MCS, f , 3, P
′) if sX ∈ FinX (3)
where P ′ = (o! ∈ Ports MCS |o ∈ + ∧ f(o!) /= ).
Phase 3 (Store outputs).
(
(sM)M∈Cˆ ,MCS, f , 3, ( )
)
→
(
(sM)M∈Cˆ ,MCS, f , 4, ( )
)
; (4)
(
(sM)M∈Cˆ ,MCS, f , 3, P
)
→
(
(s′M)M∈Cˆ ,MCS, f
′, 3, P ′
)
if P /= ( ) (5)
where there exists n ∈ + with
• P = (n!) ◦ P ′,
• (s′˜n, ()) = ˜n(s˜n, (, f(n!))),
• sM = s′M for all M ∈ Cˆ \ {˜n}, and
• f ′(n!) =  and f ≡ f ′ on ports(Cˆ ) \ {n!}.
Phase 4 (Clean up scheduling).
Let Clks := (n! ∈ Ports MCS |f(n!) /= ). Then(
(sM)M∈Cˆ ,MCS, f , 4, P
)
→
(
(sM)M∈Cˆ ,X, f
′, 1, ( )
)
if Clks = ( ) (6)
where f ′(p) =  for all p ∈ ports(Cˆ ) \ {clk?} and f ′(clk?) = 1, and
(
(sM)M∈Cˆ ,MCS, f , 4, P
)
→
(
(sM)M∈Cˆ ,MCS, f
′, 5, P ′
)
if Clks /= ( ) (7)
where
• P ′ = (Clks [1]), and
• f ′(Clks [1]c) = f(Clks [1]) and f ′(p) =  for all p ∈ ports(Cˆ ) \ {Clks [1]c}.
Phase 5 (Deliver scheduled message).
(
(sM)M∈Cˆ ,MCS, f , 5, P
)
→ sﬁn if  ∃n ∈ +: P = (n!); (8)
(
(sM)M∈Cˆ ,MCS, f , 5, (n
!)
)
→
(
(s′M)M∈Cˆ ,M
′
CS, f
′, 1, ( )
)
(9)
where there exists o ∈ + such that
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• sM = s′M for all M ∈ Cˆ \ {˜n},• (s′˜n, (o)) = ˜n(s˜n, (f(n?), )),
and
• either o =  and M′CS = X and f ′(clk?) = 1 and f ′(p) =  for all p ∈ ports(Cˆ ) \ {clk?}
• or o /=  and n? ∈ PortsM′CS and f ′(n?) = o and f ′(p) =  for all p ∈ ports(Cˆ ) \ {n?}.
Rule (8) has only been included to deﬁne the function  on the entire state space States
Cˆ
as claimed at the
beginning of the deﬁnition. It will notmatter in the execution since the previous state has to be in Phase 4, and this
ensures that P contains exactly one clock port. Similarly, the other rules make no assumptions about reachable
states. Furthermore, (s) is indeed an element of Prob(States
Cˆ
) for every s ∈ States
Cˆ
: It is deterministic for all
states s except those treated in Rule (1). For those, the claim follows immediately from the fact that MCS(sMCS , I)
is a ﬁnite distribution.
Given the global probabilistic transition function , we now obtain probability distributions on sequences
of global states by canonical constructions as for Markov chains. This even holds for inﬁnite sequences by
the theorem of Ionescu-Tulcea; see, e.g., Section V.1 of [86]. More precisely, we obtain one such probability
distribution for every global initial state. Applying the theorem of Ionescu-Tulcea to our situation yields the
following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 (Probabilities of state sequences). Let Cˆ be a complete, closed collection, and let an initial global state
ini ∈ Ini
Cˆ
be given. For each set of ﬁxed-length sequences States
Cˆ
i with i ∈ , we can deﬁne a ﬁnite probability
distribution PStates
Cˆ ,ini ,i
by
Pr(S) =
i∏
j=2
Pr(
Cˆ
(Sj−1) = Sj)
for every sequence S = (S1, . . . , Si) over StatesCˆ with S1 = ini, and Pr(S) = 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, for every sequence S ∈ States
Cˆ
i , let Rect(S) denote the corresponding rectangle of inﬁnite
sequences with this preﬁx, i.e., Rect(S) := {S ′ ∈ States
Cˆ
∞|S ′i= S}. Then there exists a unique probability distri-
bution PStates
Cˆ ,ini ,∞ over States Cˆ
∞ whose value for every rectangle R := Rect(S)with S ∈ States
Cˆ
i equals Pr(S),
or more precisely,
PrPStates
Cˆ ,ini,∞
(R) := PrPStates
Cˆ ,ini,i
(S).
We usually omit the indices “∞” and “i” of these distributions; this cannot lead to confusion.
Varying ini gives a family of probability distributions over States∞
Cˆ
; we write it
PStates
Cˆ
:=
(
PStates
Cˆ ,ini
)
ini∈Ini
Cˆ
.
So far we have deﬁned probabilities for sequences of entire global states. Each step in the runs introduced
semi-formally above intuitively corresponds to the difference between two successive states: Moreover, only the
switching of machines is considered in a run, i.e., the intermediate phases for termination checks and cleaning
up scheduling are omitted, as well as the switching of machines with empty input (after application of the length
function) because nothing happens then. We ﬁrst deﬁne the set of possible steps, i.e., ﬁve-tuples containing the
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name of the currently switched machine M, its old state, its input tuple, its new state, and its output tuple. Fur-
thermore, we deﬁne an encoding of steps as strings for the sole purpose of deﬁning overall lengths of potential
runs.
Deﬁnition 3.17 (Steps). The set of steps is deﬁned as
Steps := (+ ◦ {∼, })×∗ × (∗)∗ ×∗ × (∗)∗.
Let Steps:Steps → + denote an efﬁcient encoding from Steps into the non-empty strings over . For all
r = (ri)i∈I ∈ Steps∗ let len(r) :=
∑
i∈I size(Steps(r)), and for r ∈ Steps∞ let len(r) := ∞.
In particular, we assume that the projection to the individual components of a step is efﬁciently computable.
Now we deﬁne a mapping that extracts a run from a step sequence. Our deﬁnition ﬁrst extracts a sequence of
one potential step from each pair of a global state and the next one. This ﬁrst part maps intermediate phases to
steps with empty input tuples, so that it is then sufﬁcient to restrict the obtained sequence to the elements with a
non-empty input tuple for getting rid of both the intermediate phases and of actual switching with empty inputs.
When extracting a potential step, we mainly distinguish whether the current scheduler switches or a buffer; such
a buffer is always indicated by the ﬁrst element in the port sequence of outputs still to be handled, the ﬁfth
element of the global state.
Deﬁnition 3.18 (Run extraction). Let Cˆ be a complete, closed collection. Then the run extraction of Cˆ is the
function
run
Cˆ
:States∞
Cˆ
→ Steps∗ ∪ Steps∞
deﬁned as follows. (It is independent of Cˆ except for its domain.) Let S = (Si)i∈ ∈ States∞
Cˆ
where for each i ∈
 either Si = sﬁn or Si =
(
(siM)M∈Cˆ ,M
i
CS, f
i , ji , P i
)
. If i∗ := min{i ∈ |si = sﬁn } exists, let I := {1, . . . , i∗ − 2},
otherwise I := . We deﬁne a sequence pot_step(S) = ((ni , si , Ii , s′i ,Oi))i∈I as follows. (Thus, we already omit
the last termination check.)
• If P i = ( ) then, with M := MiCS,
− ni := nameM,
− si := siM and s′i := si+1M , and− if ji = 1 then Ii := f i(in(Ports M))lM(si) and Oi := f i+1(out(Ports M)), else Ii := () and Oi := ().
• If P i /= ( ), let p := P i[1] and p ∈ ports(˜n). Then
− ni := n∼.
− si := sin˜ and s′i := si+1n˜ ,− Ii := f i((n?,n↔?)) and Oi := f i+1((n↔!)).
Then run
Cˆ
(S ) := ((ni , si , Ii , s′i ,Oi) ∈ pot_step(S)|Ii /= (, . . . , )). For every number l ∈ , let runCˆ ,l denote the
extraction of l-step preﬁxes of runs,
run
Cˆ ,l
:States∞
Cˆ
→
⋃
il
Stepsi
with run
Cˆ ,l
(S) := run
Cˆ
(S)l.
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The run extraction is a random variable on every probability space over States∞
Cˆ
. For our particular prob-
ability space, this induces a family run
Cˆ
= (run
Cˆ ,ini
)ini∈Ini
Cˆ
of probability distributions over Steps∗ ∪ Steps∞
via
Prrun
Cˆ ,ini
(r) := PrPStates
Cˆ ,ini
(run
−1
Cˆ
(r))
for all r ∈ Steps∗ ∪ Steps∞, where run−1
Cˆ
(r) is the set of pre-images of r.
For a function l: Ini
Cˆ
→ , this similarly gives a family of probability distributions
run
Cˆ ,l
= (run
Cˆ ,ini,l(ini)
)ini∈Ini
Cˆ
,
each over
⋃
il(ini) Steps
i .
We ﬁnally introduce the view of a set Mˆ of machines in a collection. It is the restriction of a run (a sequence of
steps) to those steps whosemachine name belongs to Mˆ . The extraction function is independent of the collection,
but we index it with Cˆ anyway for similarity with the run notation.
Deﬁnition 3.19 (Views). Let Cˆ be a complete, closed collection and Mˆ ⊆ Cˆ . The view of Mˆ in Cˆ is the function
view
Cˆ
(Mˆ ):Steps∗ ∪ Steps∞ → Steps∗ ∪ Steps∞ with
view
Cˆ
(Mˆ )(r) := (si ∈ r|∃M ∈ Mˆ : si[1] = nameM).
For every number l ∈  let view
Cˆ ,l
(Mˆ ) denote the extraction of l-step preﬁxes of a view, i.e., view
Cˆ ,l
(Mˆ ):Steps∗ ∪
Steps∞ →⋃il Stepsi with viewCˆ ,l(Mˆ )(r) := viewCˆ (Mˆ )(r)l.
For a singleton Mˆ = {M}, we write view
Cˆ
(M) instead of view
Cˆ
(Mˆ ), and similar for l-step preﬁxes. Based on
the family run
Cˆ
of probability distributions of runs, this induces a family of probability distributions
view
Cˆ
(Mˆ ) = (view
Cˆ ,ini
(Mˆ ))ini∈Ini
Cˆ
over Steps∗ ∪ Steps∞. For a function l: Ini
Cˆ
→ , this similarly gives a family view
Cˆ ,l
= (view
Cˆ ,ini ,l(ini)
)ini∈Ini
Cˆ
over
⋃
il(ini) Steps
i .
Finally, we deﬁne sets of state-traces and of traces (or step-traces). Intuitively, they are the possible sequences
of global states and of steps, respectively. More precisely, each ﬁnite preﬁx of such a sequence happens with
positive probability.
Deﬁnition 3.20 (State-trace, trace). Let Cˆ be a complete, closed collection and ini ∈ Ini
Cˆ
an initial global state.
• The set of state-traces for ini is
StateTrace
Cˆ ,ini
:= {S ∈ States∞
Cˆ
|∀l ∈ :PrPStates
Cˆ ,ini,l
(S l) > 0}.
• The set of traces for ini is
StepTrace
Cˆ ,ini
:= {tr ∈ Steps∗|Prrun
Cˆ ,ini
(tr ) > 0}
∪ {tr ∈ Steps∞|∀l ∈ :Prrun
Cˆ ,ini,l
(tr l) > 0}.
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• The set of possible views of a machine set Mˆ ⊆ Cˆ for ini is
ViewTrace
Cˆ ,ini
(Mˆ ) := {v ∈ Steps∗|Prview
Cˆ ,ini
(Mˆ )(v) > 0}
∪ {v ∈ Steps∞|∀l ∈ :Prview
Cˆ ,ini,l
(Mˆ )(vl) > 0}.
Set StateTrace
Cˆ
:=⋃ini∈Ini
Cˆ
StateTrace
Cˆ ,ini
and Trace
Cˆ
:=⋃ini∈Ini
Cˆ
Trace
Cˆ ,ini
and ViewTrace
Cˆ
(Mˆ ) :=
⋃
ini∈Ini
Cˆ
ViewTrace
Cˆ ,ini
(Mˆ ).
We conclude this section with two properties of state-traces and views. The ﬁrst, technical one states that
whenever a non-buffer machine M is switched in a state-trace of Cˆ , which only happens in Phase 1, there is at
most one port p ∈ ports(Cˆ ) with a non-empty value, and it must fulﬁll p ∈ ports(M).
Lemma 3.2 (Unique Inputs in Traces). Let Cˆ be a complete, closed collection. Let S := (Si)i∈ ∈ StateTraceCˆ
where for each i ∈  either Si = sﬁn or Si =
(
(siM)M∈Cˆ ,M
i , f i , ji , P i
)
. For all i ∈  with Si /= sﬁn :
(ji = 1 ∧ ∃p ∈ ports(Cˆ ): (f i(p) /= )) ⇒ (p ∈ ports(Mi) ∧ ∀p ′ ∈ ports(Cˆ ) \ {p}: (f i(p ′) = )).
Proof. For i = 1 this holds since S ∈ StateTrace
Cˆ
implies S1 ∈ IniCˆ and each element of IniCˆ fulﬁlls the claim
with p = clk!. Let now i > 1 and Si with ji = 1. Only two cases are possible for the previous state Si−1. The case
ji−1 = 4 and Mi = X fulﬁlls the claim for p = clk? ∈ ports(X), and the case ji−1 = 5 for p = n?. 
The second property shows that the views of polynomial-time machines are polynomially bounded, and so
are runs of polynomial-time collections.
Lemma 3.3 (Polynomial Views and Traces). Let Cˆ be a complete, closed collection and let Mˆ ⊆ Cˆ be polyno-
mial-time. For all ini = ((ini M)M∈Cˆ ,X, f , 1, ( )) ∈ IniCˆ let sizeMˆ (ini ) :=
∑
M∈Mˆ size(ini M). Then there exists a
polynomial P such that for all ini ∈ Ini
Cˆ
and all v ∈ ViewTrace
Cˆ ,ini
(Mˆ ) we have len(v)  P(size
Mˆ
(ini )).
If the entire collection Cˆ is polynomial-time, then there exists a polynomial P such that for all ini ∈ Ini
Cˆ
and
all r ∈ Trace
Cˆ ,ini
we have len(r)  P(size
Cˆ
(ini )).
Proof.
By Deﬁnition 3.11, for a polynomial-time machine M, there exists a probabilistic interactive Turing machine
T that implements M and only makes a polynomial number of Turing steps, relative to the length size(ini M) of
its own input, which is smaller than the overall input size size
Mˆ
(ini ) of the considered machines. Consequently,
T and hence M can only build up a polynomial-size state and outputs, and read a polynomial-size part of its
inputs. Each step in the view requires at least one Turing step; hence there is also only a polynomial number
of these steps. Moreover, only states, outputs, and read parts of the inputs are part of the steps (see Deﬁnitions
3.16 and 3.18). This proves the ﬁrst statement.
A run of a polynomial-time collection Cˆ consists of the steps of its polynomial-time machines and
its buffers. Buffers are not polynomial-time, but weakly polynomial-time; this follows immediately from
the assumption we made about the encoding  of the internal queue. Each buffer obtains all its in-
puts from polynomial-time machines; hence its overall input is of polynomial length. Thus, each buffer
only makes a polynomial number of Turing steps. This yields an overall polynomial size of its steps as
above. 
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4. Security-speciﬁc system model
Security-speciﬁc structures are deﬁned as collections of machines with distinguished service ports for the
honest users, as explained in the introduction. Such structures are augmented by arbitrary machines H and
A representing the honest users and the adversary, who can interact. We then speak of a conﬁguration. For
conﬁgurations, we also introduce speciﬁc families of executions corresponding to different security parameters
for cryptographic aspects.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Structures and service ports). A structure is a pair struc = (Mˆ ,S) where Mˆ is a collection of
simple machines with {1}∗ ⊆ Ini M for all M ∈ Mˆ , and S ⊆ free([Mˆ ]). The set S is called service ports.
Forbidden ports for users of a structure are those that clash with port names of given machines and those that
would link the user to a non-service port.
Deﬁnition 4.2 (Forbidden ports). For a structure (Mˆ ,S) let S¯
Mˆ
:= free([Mˆ ]) \ S. We call forb(Mˆ ,S) :=
ports(Mˆ ) ∪ S¯
Mˆ
c the forbidden ports.
A system is a set of structures. The idea behind systems, as motivated in the introduction, is that there may
be different actual structures depending on the set of actually malicious participants. Typical derivations of
systems from one explicitly deﬁned intended structure and a trust model will be discussed in Section 6.
Deﬁnition 4.3 (Systems). A system Sys is a set of structures. It is (weakly) polynomial-time iff the machine
collections Mˆ of all its structures are (weakly) polynomial-time.
A conﬁguration consists of a structure together with a user machine and an adversary machine (or user and
adversary for short). The user is restricted to connecting to the service ports. The adversary closes the collection,
i.e., it connects to the remaining service ports, to the other free ports S¯
Mˆ
of the collection, and to the free ports
of the user. Thus, user and adversary can interact, e.g., for modeling active attacks.
Deﬁnition 4.4 (Conﬁgurations).
(a) A conﬁguration of a structure (Mˆ ,S) is a tuple conf = (Mˆ ,S,H,A) where
− H is a machine called user without forbidden ports, i.e., ports(H) ∩ forb(Mˆ ,S) = ∅, and with {1}∗ ⊆
Ini H,
− A is machine called adversary with {1}∗ ⊆ Ini A,
− and the completion Cˆ := [Mˆ ∪ {H,A}] is a closed collection.
(b) The set of conﬁgurations of (Mˆ ,S) is written Conf(Mˆ ,S). The set of conﬁgurations of (Mˆ ,S) with poly-
nomial-time user H and adversary A is written Confpoly(Mˆ ,S).
(c) The set of conﬁgurations of a systemSys is deﬁned as Conf(Sys ) :=⋃
(Mˆ ,S)∈Sys Conf(Mˆ ,S), and similarly
Confpoly(Sys ) :=
⋃
(Mˆ ,S)∈Sys Confpoly(Mˆ ,S).
We omit the index “poly” from Confpoly(Sys ) if it is clear from the context.
In cryptographic applications, all machines typically start with the same security parameter. An informal
description of runs and views of conﬁgurations based on the informal description of runs and views of collec-
tions from Section 3.5 is thus simply obtained by restricting the tuple ini of initial states. For reasons of rigor,
we deﬁne runs and views of conﬁgurations based on the rigorous deﬁnitions of global states, runs, and views of
collections from Section 3.5 by making a global constraint on the valid global initial states in the family of runs
of a conﬁguration that the security parameters are equal.
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Deﬁnition 4.5 (Runs and views of conﬁgurations). Let conf = (Mˆ ,S,H,A) be a conﬁguration and Cˆ := [Mˆ ∪
{H,A}]. We deﬁne Iniconf :=
{
((1k)M∈Mˆ∪{H,A} ◦ (())˜n∈Cˆ ,X, f , 1, ( ))|k ∈ 
}
⊆ Ini
Cˆ
with X and f as in Deﬁni-
tion 3.15. Then we deﬁne the family of probability distributions of runs of the conﬁguration as
runconf := (runCˆ ,ini)ini∈Iniconf
and for all sets Mˆ ′ ⊆ Cˆ the family of probability distributions of views similarly
view
Cˆ
(Mˆ ′) := (view
Cˆ ,ini
(Mˆ ′))ini∈Iniconf,
and analogously for l-step preﬁxes. Furthermore, we identify Iniconf with  and thus write runconf,k etc. for the
individual probability distributions in the families.
5. Reactive simulatability
Reactive simulatability, our notion of secure reﬁnement, is deﬁned for individual structures and lifted to
entire systems. Two structures struc 1 and struc2 can be compared if they have the same service ports, so that
the same honest users can connect to them. In other words, they offer the same interface for the design of a
larger system, so that either struc 1 or struc2 can be plugged into that system. Now struc 1 is considered at least as
secure as struc2, written struc 1 ≥ struc2, if whatever any adversary A1 can do to any honest user H using struc 1,
some adversary A2 can do to the same H using struc2 essentially with the same probability. More precisely, the
families of views of H in these two conﬁgurations are indistinguishable.
Different variants of indistinguishability are based on different classes of small functions (occurring as differ-
ences). The most important class is that of negligible functions; additionally we deﬁne closure properties that
we require of suitable classes of small functions.
Deﬁnition 5.1 (Small functions).
(a) The class NEGL of negligible functions contains all functions s: → 0 that decrease faster than the
inverse of every polynomial, i.e., for all positive polynomials Q ∃k0 ∀k > k0 : s(k) < 1Q(k) .
(b) A set SMALL of functions  → 0 is a suitable class of small functions if it is closed under addition, and
with a function g also contains every function g′: → 0 with g′  g.
Typical classes of small functions are EXPSMALL, which contains all functions bounded by Q(k) · 2−k for
a polynomial Q, and the larger class NEGL.
Simulatability is based on indistinguishability of views; hence we repeat the deﬁnition of indistinguishability,
essentially from [100].
Deﬁnition5.2 (Indistinguishability).Twofamilies (vark)k∈ and (var′k)k∈ ofprobabilitydistributions (or random
variables) on common domains (Dk)k∈ are
(a) perfectly indistinguishable (“=”) iff ∀k ∈ : vark = var′k .
(b) statistically indistinguishable (“≈SMALL”) for a suitable classSMALLof small functions iff the distributions
are discrete and their statistical distances, as a function of k , are small, i.e.,
(stat(vark , var′k))k∈ :=
⎛
⎜
⎝ sup
Vk⊆Dk
Vkmeasurable
|Pr(vark ∈ Vk)− Pr(var′k ∈ Vk)|
⎞
⎟
⎠
k∈
∈ SMALL.
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(c) computationally indistinguishable (“≈poly”) iff for every algorithm Dis (the distinguisher) that is probabi-
listic polynomial-time in its ﬁrst input,
(|Pr(Dis(1k , vark) = 1)− Pr(Dis(1k , var′k) = 1)|)k∈ ∈ NEGL.
(Intuitively, Dis, given the security parameter and an element chosen according to either vark or var′k , tries
to guess which distribution the element came from.)
We write ≈ if we want to treat all cases together.
Note that for countable Dk , statistical indistinguishability can be rewritten in the more common form of
requiring
(
1
2
∑
d∈Dk |Pr(vark = d)− Pr(var
′
k = d)|
)
k∈
∈ SMALL.
We now present the reactive simulatability deﬁnition. One technical problem is that a user might legitimately
connect to the service ports in a conﬁguration of (Mˆ 1,S), but in a conﬁguration of (Mˆ 2,S) the same user might
have forbidden ports. This is excluded by considering suitable conﬁgurations only.
Deﬁnition 5.3 (Suitable conﬁgurations for structures). Let (Mˆ 1,S) and (Mˆ 2,S) be structures with the same
set of service ports. The set of suitable conﬁgurations ConfMˆ 2(Mˆ 1,S) ⊆ Conf(Mˆ 1,S) is deﬁned by (Mˆ 1,S,
H,A) ∈ ConfMˆ 2(Mˆ 1,S) iff ports(H) ∩ forb(Mˆ 2,S) = ∅. The set of polynomial-time suitable conﬁgurations is
ConfMˆ 2poly(Mˆ 1,S) := ConfMˆ 2(Mˆ 1,S) ∩ Confpoly(Mˆ 1,S).
As we have three different notions of indistinguishability, our reactive simulatability deﬁnition also comes in
three ﬂavors. Furthermore, we distinguish the general reactive simulatability (GRSIM) as sketched so far and
a stronger universal version (URSIM) where one adversary A2 must be able to work for all users. Note that the
term “reactive simulatability” is primarily meant to capture the overall idea of suitably comparing the views of
honest users when interacting with reactive protocols; in follow-up papers, reactive simulatability is sometimes
also used as a synonym for general reactive simulatability.
Deﬁnition 5.4 (General/Universal reactive simulatability for structures). Let structures (Mˆ 1,S) and (Mˆ 2,S) with
identical sets of service ports be given.
(a) (Mˆ 1,S) ≥perfsec (Mˆ 2,S), spoken perfectly at least as secure as, iff for every conﬁguration conf 1 = (Mˆ 1,S,
H,A1) ∈ ConfMˆ 2(Mˆ 1,S), there exists a conﬁguration conf 2 = (Mˆ 2,S,H,A2) ∈ Conf(Mˆ 2,S) (with the same
H) such that
viewconf1(H) = viewconf2(H).
(b) (Mˆ 1,S) ≥SMALLsec (Mˆ 2,S) for a suitable class SMALL of small functions, spoken statistically at least as
secure as, iff for every conﬁguration conf 1 = (Mˆ 1,S,H,A1) ∈ ConfMˆ 2(Mˆ 1,S), there exists a conﬁguration
conf 2 = (Mˆ 2,S,H,A2) ∈ Conf(Mˆ 2,S) (with the same H) such that
viewconf1(H) ≈SMALL viewconf2(H).1
(c) (Mˆ 1,S) ≥polysec (Mˆ 2,S), spoken computationally at least as secure as, iff for every conﬁguration conf 1 =
(Mˆ 1,S,H,A1) ∈ ConfMˆ 2poly(Mˆ 1,S), there exists a conﬁguration conf 2 = (Mˆ 2,S,H,A2) ∈ Confpoly(Mˆ 2,S)
(with the same H) such that
viewconf1(H) ≈poly viewconf2(H).
1 Previous versions of the Reactive Simulatability framework erroneously required statistical indistinguishability to hold only for poly-
nomially bounded preﬁxes of user views. As pointed out in [66], extending this requirement to user views without additional contraints is
necessary to achieve compositionality results in general.
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In all three cases, we speakof universal reactive simulatability (URSIM) ifA2 in conf 2 does not dependonH (only
on Mˆ 1, S, and A1), and we use the notation ≥uni,perfsec etc. for this. In all cases, we call conf 2 an indistinguishable
conﬁguration for conf 1.
There is also a notion of blackbox reactive simulatability (BRSIM), where the adversary A2 consists of a ﬁxed
part, called simulator, using A1 as a blackbox submachine. However, its rigorous deﬁnition needs the notion
of machine combination, which we postpone to the successor paper dealing with composition. If one can sim-
ply set A2 := A1, we also say that the structures are observationally equivalent, or simply indistinguishable; this
corresponds to the deﬁnition in [73].
Where the difference between the types of security is irrelevant, we simply writesec, and we omit the index
sec if it is clear from the context.
Remark 5.1.Adding a free adversary out-port in the comparison (like the guessing-outputs used to deﬁne seman-
tic security of encryption systems in [59]), thus taking the view of the adversary into account, does not make
the deﬁnition stricter since the universal quantiﬁcation over the honest user and the adversary could always
be exploited to provide information that the adversary knows to the honest user: Any such out-port can be
connected to an in-port added to the honest user with sufﬁciently large length bounds. H does not react on
inputs at this new in-port, but nevertheless it is included in the view of H, i.e., in the comparison. A rigorous
proof can be found in [4].
The deﬁnition of general and universal reactive simulatability can be lifted from structures to systems Sys1
and Sys2 by comparing their respective structures. However, we do not want to compare a structure of Sys1 with
arbitrary structures of Sys2, but only with certain “suitable” ones. What suitable means in a concrete situation
can be deﬁned by a mapping f from Sys1 to the powerset of Sys2. The mapping f is called valid if it maps
structures with the same set of service ports, so that the same user can connect.
Deﬁnition 5.5 (Valid mappings). Let Sys1 and Sys2 be two systems. A valid mapping between Sys1 and Sys2 is
a function f :Sys1 → PSys2 \ ∅ with S1 = S2 for all (Mˆ 1,S1) ∈ Sys1 and (Mˆ 2,S2) ∈ f((Mˆ 1,S1)). The elements
of f((Mˆ 1,S1)) are called the corresponding structures for (Mˆ 1,S1).
Remark 5.2. In the synchronous model in [91], we allow more general users and valid mappings. The stronger
requirements here simplify the presentation and are sufﬁcient for all cryptographic examples we considered.
The report version of [91] contains non-cryptographic examples with S1 /= S2.
Deﬁnition 5.6 (General/Universal reactive simulatability for systems). Let systems Sys1 and Sys2 be given, and
let f be a valid mapping between Sys1 and Sys2.
(a) Sys1 ≥f ,perfsec Sys2, spoken perfectly at least as secure as, iff for every (Mˆ 1,S) ∈ Sys1 there exists (Mˆ 2,S) ∈
f((Mˆ 1,S)) such that
(Mˆ 1,S) ≥f ,perfsec (Mˆ 2,S).
(b) Sys1 ≥f ,SMALLsec Sys2 for a suitable class SMALL of small functions, spoken statistically at least as secure
as, iff for every (Mˆ 1,S) ∈ Sys1 there exists (Mˆ 2,S) ∈ f((Mˆ 1,S)) such that
(Mˆ 1,S) ≥f ,SMALLsec (Mˆ 2,S).
(c) Sys1 ≥f ,polysec Sys2, spoken computationally at least as secure as, iff for every (Mˆ 1,S) ∈ Sys1 there exists
(Mˆ 2,S) ∈ f((Mˆ 1,S)) such that
(Mˆ 1,S) ≥f ,polysec (Mˆ 2,S).
In all three cases, we speak of universal reactive simulatability if the respective relation on structures fulﬁlls
universal simulatability, and we use the notation ≥f ,uni,perfsec etc. for this.
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where the difference between the types of security is irrelevant, we simply writesec, and we again omit the
index sec if it is clear from the context.
We conclude this section with two technical lemmas capturing an equivalent deﬁnition of the forbidden ports
of a structure and additional results on valid mappings and suitable conﬁgurations, which is useful in proofs.
Recall that Deﬁnition 4.4 excludes users that would connect to the forbidden ports of a conﬁguration. The
following lemma establishes an equivalent condition.
Lemma 5.1 (Users). Let (Mˆ ,S) be a structure. Then for all machines H, ports(H) ∩ forb(Mˆ ,S) = ∅ is equivalent
to ports(H) ∩ ports(Mˆ ) = ∅ (1) and ports(H)c ∩ ports([Mˆ ]) ⊆ S (2).
Proof. Let inner(Cˆ ) := ports(Cˆ ) \ free(Cˆ ) for every collection Cˆ . Clearly inner(Cˆ )c = inner(Cˆ ). The con-
dition on the left-hand side is equivalent to (1) and ports(H)c ∩ (free([Mˆ ]) \ S) = ∅ (3). Now (3) ⇔
ports(H)c ∩ free([Mˆ ]) ⊆ S. It remains to be shown that ports(H)c ∩ inner([Mˆ ]) = ∅. This is equivalent to
ports(H) ∩ inner([Mˆ ]) = ∅. Now ports([Mˆ ]) only contains additional buffer ports and clock in-ports com-
pared with ports(Mˆ ). Hence (1) even implies ports(H) ∩ ports([Mˆ ]) = ∅. 
The following lemma shows that the ports of a structure that users are intended to use, i.e., the complement
of the service ports, are not at the same time forbidden. Moreover, it shows that a non-suitable conﬁguration
can be transformed into a suitable one via port renaming such that this renaming does not affect the view of
the user. This means that the restriction to suitable conﬁgurations in the deﬁnition of reactive simulatability is
without loss of generality.
Lemma 5.2 (Valid mappings and suitable conﬁgurations). Let (Mˆ 1,S) and (Mˆ 2,S) be structures.
(a)Then Sc ∩ forb(Mˆ 1,S) = ∅.
(b)For every conf 1 = (Mˆ 1,S,H,A1) ∈ Conf(Mˆ 1,S) \ ConfMˆ 2(Mˆ 1,S), there is a conﬁguration
conf f,1 = (Mˆ 1,S,Hf,Af,1) ∈ ConfMˆ 2(Mˆ 1,S) such that viewconf f,1(Hf) = viewconf1(H).
Proof.For Part (a) recall that forb(Mˆ ,S) = ports(Mˆ 1) ∪ (free([Mˆ 1]) \ S)c. The partSc ∩ (free([Mˆ 1]) \ S)c = ∅
is clear, and Sc ∩ ports(Mˆ 1) = ∅ follows from S ⊆ free([Mˆ 1]).
For Part (b), we want to construct Hf by giving each port p = nld ∈ ports(H) ∩ forb(Mˆ 2,S) a new name.
Since runs and views do not depend on port names, cf. Deﬁnition 3.5, they remain the same if we consistently
rename all other ports q with name(q) = n (at most ﬁve). The new collection is a conﬁguration (Mˆ 1,S,Hf,Af,1)
if no renamed port belongs to Mˆ 1. Assume that q = nl′d ′ ∈ ports(Mˆ 1) is such a renamed port, then n˜ ∈ [Mˆ 1]
and hence pc ∈ ports([Mˆ 1]). Now Lemma 5.1 implies pc ∈ S, hence Part (a) applied to the structure (Mˆ 2,S)
implies p ∈ forb(Mˆ 2,S), in contradiction to the original condition on p . 
6. Special cases for cryptographic purposes
In the presence of adversaries, the structure of correct machines running may not be the intended structure
that the designer originally planned. For instance, some machines might have been corrupted; hence they are
missing from the actual structure and the adversary took over their connections. We model this by deﬁning
a system as a set of possible actual structures. A system is typically derived automatically from an intended
structure and a trust model. We deﬁne this for static and adaptive adversaries, arbitrary access structures lim-
iting the corruption capabilities of an adversary, and different channel types. While one typically considers all
basic channels insecure in a security protocol, secure or authentic channels are useful to model initialization
phases, e.g., the assumption that a public-key infrastructure exists. In contrast to some formal methods which
immediately abstract from cryptography, we cannot represent this by a ﬁxed initial key set because we need
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Fig. 6. Channel modiﬁcations for authenticated and insecure channels.
probabilities over the key generation for security; moreover, this would not allow a polynomial number of keys
to be chosen reactively.
Cryptographic systems come in two ﬂavors, depending on how the adversary takes control over certain
machines. If malicious machines are malicious from the beginning, we call the system a static standard cryp-
tographic system. If the adversary may corrupt machines during the protocol executions, depending on the
knowledge that he has already collected, we speak of an adaptive standard cryptographic system.
6.1. Trust models and intended structures
We start with the deﬁnition of trust models for a structure. Trust models consist of two parts: an access
structure and a channel model. Access structures will later be used to denote the possible sets of correct machines
in an intended structure. Access structures have to be closed under insertion, i.e., with every such set, every larger
set is contained as well.
Deﬁnition 6.1 (Access structure). Let Abe an arbitrary set. Then ACC ⊆ P(A ) is called an access structure for A
iff (B ∈ ACC ∧ C ∈ P(A) ∧ B ⊆ C)⇒ C ∈ ACC for all sets B and C.
Typical examples of access structures are threshold structures ACCt,n := {H ⊆ A||H|  t} with t  n.
A channel model for a structure classiﬁes each internal high-level connection as secure (private and authen-
tic), authenticated (only authentic), or insecure (neither private nor authentic), represented as elements of the set
{s,a, i}. What this means will become clear in Section 6.2.
Deﬁnition 6.2 (Channel model). A channel model for a structure (Mˆ ,S) is a mapping 	:Gr(Mˆ ) → {s,a, i}.
Deﬁnition 6.3 (Trust model). A trust model for a structure (Mˆ ,S) is a pair (ACC,	) where ACC is an access
structure for Mˆ , and 	 is a channel model for (Mˆ ,S).
We proceed with the deﬁnition of intended structures, i.e., structures a designer of a security protocol would
typically design. An intended structure is a structure that is benign in the sense that it does not offer any free
simple ports for the adversary. Moreover, we demand that a machine of a structure may only schedule those
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connections for which it owns the corresponding input or output port, i.e., it does not intend to schedule users
and adversaries. We distinguish three different kinds of intended structures, depending on how the channels
between the system and the user are clocked. We call the structure localized if every output is clocked by the
outputting machine itself. Structures of this kind are typically used as local submachines that can be clocked by
the overall protocol and then immediately deliver a result. If the adversary clocks the communication between
the structure and the user, we call the structure stand-alone. Finally, if the user and the system have to fetch the
outputs of the other, we call the structure fetching.
Remark 6.1. We could as well distinguish channels from the user to the system and vice versa, e.g., to deﬁne that
users schedule their outputs and fetch their inputs. This would give nine different combinations. Modifying the
upcoming deﬁnition of intended structures in such a way is trivial.
The derivation of the remaining structures based on the intended structure will rely on modifying the connec-
tions in an adequate way, e.g., by duplicating output ports that output on authentic channels so that one output
port is connected as usual and the duplicated port is connected to the adversary. Hence, derived structures
need an extended set of possible port names. Moreover, we will need a distinguished state and distinguished
ports to model adaptive corruptions of machines. Technically, we therefore parameterize intended structures
by an additional alphabet 
 with |
| = || − 2 and a state scorr , and we restrict port names in the intended
structure to 
+ and possible states to ∗ \ {scorr}.
Deﬁnition 6.4 (Intended structure). A structure (Mˆ ∗,S∗) is called an intended structure for scorr ∈ ∗ and 
 ⊂ 
with |
| = || − 2 iff
• all M ∈ Mˆ ∗ are simple, name(p) ∈ 
+ for all p ∈ ports(Mˆ ∗), and scorr ∈ StatesM for all M ∈ Mˆ ∗,
• for all M ∈ Mˆ ∗: (n! ∈ ports(M) ⇒ (n? ∈ ports(M)) ∨ (n! ∈ ports(M))), and
• it has one of the following properties. Let S′ := {p ∈ free([Mˆ ∗])|label(pc) = }.
− The structure is called localized iff
S∗ = S′ ∪ {n?|n! ∈ free([Mˆ ∗])c}.
and the following condition on the port set of Mˆ ∗ holds:
n? ∈ free([Mˆ ∗])c ⇒ n! ∈ ports(Mˆ ∗) # Mˆ ∗ schedules its outputs to the user
− The structure is called stand-alone iff S∗ = S′ and
(n, , d) ∈ free([Mˆ ∗])c ⇒ n! ∈ ports(Mˆ ∗) # Mˆ ∗ does not schedule any connection
# between the user and Mˆ ∗
− The structure is called fetching iff
S∗ = S′ ∪ {n?|n? ∈ free([Mˆ ∗])c}
and the following condition on the port set of Mˆ ∗ holds:
n! ∈ free([Mˆ ∗])c ⇒ n! ∈ ports(Mˆ ∗) # Mˆ ∗ schedules the inputs from the user
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6.2. Standard static cryptographic systems
Standard static cryptographic systems are derived from an intended structure and a trust model as follows.
Each system contains one structure for each element of the considered access structure, i.e., for each set H of
potential correct machines.
The channel model is taken into account as follows. Intuitively, we change the connections such that the
adversary receives messages sent on authenticated and insecure channels, and we enable him to arbitrarily mod-
ify messages sent on insecure channels. This is modeled as depicted in Fig. 6 for authenticated and insecure
channels; secure channels remain unchanged. Authenticated channels are modeled by additional out-ports pd!
where outputs at p! are duplicated. The port pd! remains free; hence the adversary can connect to it. Insecure
channels are modeled by renaming the input port. This breaks the existing connection and places the adversary
in between.
Moreover, if p? belongs to a correct machine and p! does not, we also rename p? into pa? so that all inputs
from the adversary have superscript a. By applying these changes to a machine M, we get a modiﬁed machine
MH,	.
Formally, let {a,d} :=  \ 
. Then we deﬁne two mappings ϕa and ϕd that assign each port p = (n, l, d) with
n ∈ 
+ ports (an, l, d) and (dn, l, d), respectively. We write pa and pd instead of ϕa(p) and ϕd(p).
We now deﬁne the derivation of static cryptographic systems from a given intended structure and a trust
model rigorously. Similar to the deﬁnition of runs, the semi-formal description given above is sufﬁcient to
understand our subsequent results, so the following technical deﬁnition can be skipped at ﬁrst reading.
Deﬁnition 6.5 (Derivation of standard static cryptographic systems). Let (Mˆ ∗,S∗) be an intended structure for
a state scorr and a set 
, and let (ACC,	) be a trust model for (Mˆ ∗,S∗). Then the corresponding cryptographic
system with static adversary
Sys = StanStat ((Mˆ ∗,S∗), (ACC,	))
is Sys := {(MˆH,SH)|H ∈ ACC} where for all H ∈ ACC:
• SH := S∗ ∩ free([H]).
• MˆH := {MH,	|M ∈ H}, where
MH,	 = (nameM,Ports MH,	 ,StatesM, MH,	 , lM, IniM,FinM)
is deﬁned as follows:
− The sequence Ports MH,	 is derived by the following algorithm.
Ports MH,	 := ( ).
for p ∈ Ports M (in the given order) do
if c := {p , pC} ∈ Gr(H) ∧ 	(c) = a ∧ dir(p) = ! then
Ports MH,	 := Ports MH,	 ◦ (p , pd)
else if c := {p , pC} ∈ Gr(H) ∧ 	(c) = i ∧ dir(p) = ? then
Ports MH,	 := Ports MH,	 ◦ (pa)
else if c := {p , pC} ∈ Gr(H) ∧ dir(p) = ? then
Ports MH,	 := Ports MH,	 ◦ (pa)
else
Ports MH,	 := Ports MH,	 ◦ (p)
end if
end for
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− Let s, s′ ∈ StatesM, I ∈ (∗)|in(ports(M))|, O1 ∈ (∗)|out(ports(M))| and O2 ∈ (∗)|out(ports(MH,	))|. Then
Pr(MH,	(s, I) = (s′,O2)) := Pr(M(s, I) = (s′,O1)) if O2 is derived from O1 by the following algorithm,
and zero otherwise.2
i := 1
for j := 1, . . . , |out(ports(MH,	))| do
if (out(Ports MH,	))[j] = pd for a port p then
O2[j] := O2[j − 1]
else
O2[j] := O1[i]
i := i + 1
end if
end for
6.3. Standard cryptographic systems with adaptive adversaries
Standard static cryptographic systems as deﬁned in the previous section are based on the intuition that
corrupted machines are corrupted right from the start, e.g., they belong to untrusted owners. In adaptive (or
dynamic) adversary models the set of corrupted machines can increase over time, e.g., because there is a “master
adversary” who has to hack intomachines in order to corrupt them [31,38]. Adaptive adversarymodels are more
powerful than static ones, i.e., there are examples of systems secure against static adversaries that are insecure
against adaptive adversaries who can corrupt the same number of machines [38].
For a given intended structure and a channel model, the corresponding cryptographic system with adaptive
adversary has only one structure. Similar to the derivation of static cryptographic systems from an intended
structure, we deﬁne the derivation of amachine Mcorr,	 from eachmachine M. This derivation is used to grant the
adversary the possibility to corruptmachines during the global execution. This ismodeled by giving Mcorr,	 a cor-
ruption port corruptMcorr,	?, which is used for corruption requests, and two new ports cor_outMcorr,	 !, cor_inMcorr,	?
for communication with the adversary after corruption. We assume that these ports must neither occur in an
intended structure nor after port renaming as deﬁned for the static case; this can be achieved by encoding the
names of these ports into + \ ({,a,d} ◦ 
+) where  = 
 ∪ {a,d}. The corruption port must connect to the
service ports. Upon a non-empty input at the corruption port, Mcorr sends its current state to the adversary
via cor_outMcorr,	 !, and from now on acts transparently, i.e., every input (I1, . . . , Is) is translated into the output
(I1, . . . , Is) at cor_outMcorr,	 !, and every input (b) at cor_inMcorr,	? is ﬁrst decomposed as (O1, . . . ,Ot) := −1(b)
and then output at the respective output ports.
Deﬁnition 6.6 (Derivation of standard adaptive cryptographic systems). Let (Mˆ ∗,S∗) be an intended structure for
a state scorr and a set 
, and let 	 be a channel model 	 for (Mˆ ∗,S∗). Then the corresponding cryptographic
system with adaptive adversary
Sys = StanAdap
(
(Mˆ ∗,S∗),	
)
is Sys := {(Mˆ ,S)} where
• S := S∗ ∪ {corruptM↔?|M ∈ Mˆ ∗}.
• Mˆ := {Mcorr,	|M ∈ Mˆ ∗}, where Mcorr,	 is derived from M with H = Mˆ as follows: Let MH,	 be the machine
deﬁned in the static case (Deﬁnition 6.5). Then
Mcorr,	 = (nameM,Ports Mcorr,	 ,StatesMcorr,	 , Mcorr,	 , lMcorr,	 , IniM,FinM)
2 Note that |in(ports(M))| = |in(ports(MH,	))| by deﬁnition; hence I is also a valid input tuple for the machine MH,	 .
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is deﬁned as follows:
− Ports Mcorr,	 := Ports MH,	 ◦ (corruptMcorr,	?, cor_outMcorr,	 !, cor_inMcorr,	?).
− StatesMcorr,	 := StatesM ∪ {scorr}.
− lMcorr,	(s) := lM(s) ◦ (1, 0) for s ∈ StatesM, and lMcorr,	(scorr) := (∞, . . . ,∞) ◦ (0,∞).− Let I =: I ′ ◦ (a, b). If (a, b) = (, ) and s /= scorr , then Mcorr,	(s, I) := MH,	(s, I ′) ◦ (). Otherwise
Mcorr,	(s, I) := (s′,O) with O := O′ ◦ (o) is deﬁned as follows:
if a /=  and s /= scorr then
s′ := scorr , o := s, and O′ := (, . . . , )
else if s = scorr then
o := (I)
if b =  then
O′ = (, . . . , )
else
(o1, . . . , ot) := −1(b) and t′ := size(out(Ports MH,	))
O′[j] := oj for j = 1, . . . ,min(t, t′) and O′[j] :=  for j = t + 1, . . . , t′
end if
end if
Note that Mcorr,	 is not polynomial-time. Explicitly bounding the number of bits read in a corrupted state
independent of the adversary does not capture our intuition of a machine that acts transparently for any adver-
sary, and an explicit bound would severely limit the adversary’s capabilities. The fundamental problem is that
transparent machines are by deﬁnition not polynomial-time but only weakly polynomial-time.
Several extensions are possible: One may extend the corruption responses to two classes of storage, an eras-
able and a non-erasable one, e.g., to model the different vulnerability of session keys and long-term keys. This
means to reﬁne the state spaces of each machine as a Cartesian product. Inputs and outputs would be treated
like erasable storage. One can also model non-binary corruption requests, e.g., stop requests and requests to
corrupt different classes of storage. To model proactive systems [87], one needs repair requests in addition to
corruption requests, and appropriate repair responses, e.g., returning to an initial state with only a certain class
of storage still intact.
7. Summary
We have presented a rigorous model for secure reactive systems with cryptographic parts in asynchronous
networks. Common types of cryptographic systems and their trust models were expressed as special cases of this
model, in particular systems with static or adaptive adversaries and with different types of underlying channels.
We have deﬁned reactive simulatability as a notion of reﬁnement that retains not only integrity properties but
also conﬁdentiality.
As design principles based on thismodel, we propose to keep speciﬁcations of cryptographic systems abstract,
i.e., free of all implementation details and deterministic unless the desired functionality is probabilistic by nature,
e.g., a common coin-ﬂipping protocol. This allows the cryptographically veriﬁed abstractions to be used as
building blocks for systems that can be subjected to formal veriﬁcation. Suitable abstractions sometimes have to
explicitly include tolerable imperfections of systems, e.g., leakage of the length of encrypted messages or abilities
of the adversary to disrupt protocol runs. In subsequent work, we already showed multiple desired properties
of reactive simulatability, in particular composition and property-preservation theorems. We also proved sev-
eral building blocks like secure message transmission and a Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library with nested
operations. Moreover, we demonstrated the applicability of formal methods over our model by small examples.
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